

# Military Intelligence



April - June 1989  
PB 34-89-2

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# Military Intelligence

## From the Home of Intelligence

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## 1989 writer's guide for MI Magazine

Dear Writer,

Thank you for taking a professional interest in military intelligence. We need good soldiers who can and will communicate ideas that make our Army better.

Let me tell you about MI Magazine. We are a professional bulletin as described in AR 25-30 which "contains instructions, guidance, and other material that serves to enhance, on a continuing basis, the professional development of individuals within a specified functional area. What that MEANS is, MI Magazine is a place to share good ideas, expertise, soldiering lessons learned, stories, and things MI soldiers should know. For example, you may be surprised to learn that your area of expertise or your thoughts may be very interesting and helpful to MI soldiers throughout the world.

That tells you WHAT we want. Let me tell you HOW we want it. Write your articles using the guidelines described in the Effective Writing for Army Leaders, DA Pamphlet 600-67.

I'll summarize them here for you.

- > Put your bottom line up front.
- > Use the active voice.
- > Use short sentences (an average of 15 or fewer words).
- > Develop your ideas into short paragraphs.
- > Use "I", "you", and "we" as subjects of sentences when it makes sense to do so.


If you write with those five thoughts in mind, I will be more likely to publish your work. Use 2500 words as a target-size for your articles. Send me good-looking, double-spaced, letter-quality printed or typed manuscripts. Good graphics and photographs add a great deal of interest to your work. Feel free to send some along if you can.

Bottom-line—when you submit something to be published (anywhere), put yourself in the reader's position. Would you enjoy reading what you wrote?

Send your material to: MI Magazine  
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If I can help you, call me — autovon 879-0675 or commercial (602) 538-0675.

Thanks again. I look forward to seeing your work. Soldiers deserve the best.



John Vance, editor.



# from the Commander

**Major General Julius Parker Jr.**

Success on future mid- and high-intensity battlefields will be dictated by the effectiveness of surveillance, reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance operations. Technological sophistication will require a thorough knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain for battlefield success. Therefore, one of the most powerful keys to winning will be the Military Intelligence professional who must be an expert in the reconnaissance and surveillance planning process.

A 1987 Rand Study, "Tactical Reconnaissance Lessons Learned at the NTC," showed that there is a direct correlation between effective reconnaissance and surveillance and Task Force mission success. Nevertheless, today (1989), lessons learned from the NTC, as well as other training grounds, highlight shortfalls in the execution of surveillance, reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance functions by brigade and battalion task force. Of primary concern to me as the MI proponent, is the lack of emphasis placed on the planning and execution in these vital areas.

While using NTC data as the vehicle for discussing surveillance, reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance, I must emphasize that the Task Force S2 is the reconnaissance and surveillance mission planner. Although the scout platoon is the Task Force commander's single most important asset for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes, it is not the panacea to the commander's problem. Full exploitation of scouts, even with material enhancement, cannot be achieved without proper mission planning by the S2 to adequately capture the commander's intent in the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan. The S2's challenge then, is to develop a comprehensive multi-asset Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan for each Task Force mission. The battlefield information gathered in response to this plan is the data that will set the stage for follow-on Task Force mission successes or failures. The object of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan is to confirm or deny the S2's hypothesis regarding the enemy's intent and courses of action. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets should provide timely combat information so the commander can allocate combat power at the critical place and time on the battlefield.

Reconnaissance and surveillance planning begins with the mission. Upon its receipt the S2 initiates the IPB process. By the time the commander gathers the staff for his initial mission analysis, a quick evaluation of the area of operation should have been accomplished. In this initial session, the S2 recommends an outline which captures the commander's information requirements and his area of interest. The commander's information requirements will serve to focus the IPB effort and further refine reconnaissance and surveillance requirements. Despite not having completed the entire IPB process, the S2 also recommends initial reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

The basis for the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan is the Event Template. It contains Named Areas of Interest (NAI) which, when covered by collection assets, will confirm or deny the S2's key hypothesis on the enemy's intent and most probable course of action. It is critical that the S2 be conversant with all reconnaissance and surveillance assets capable of collecting on NAI. Besides the scout platoon, other assets at the brigade and Task Force levels include: GSRs, OP/LPs, patrols, engineers, FISTS, aviation and chemical teams.

Once assets are identified to cover selected NAIs, commander approval must be acquired and coordination with the S3 for asset tasking must be accomplished. A good SOP will facilitate much of the coordination. The S2 should brief, whenever possible, the scouts, any maneuver augmentees and the GSR teams. The "scouts out" mentality to just get people out and looking should be avoided. It is imperative to work quickly; however, they must be fully briefed and cognizant of the targets and reporting requirements.

Finally, success of the reconnaissance and surveillance effort depends on the S2's knowledge of enemy tactics and ability to piece together an accurate battle picture for the commander to fight the battle.

I charge each of you to continue to enhance your reconnaissance and surveillance skills so that we win tomorrow's battle. *Toujours en avant....*

**Always Out Front!**



# from the CSM



## Command Sergeant Major David P. Klehn

On the 28th of March I became the Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School and the Sergeant Major of the Military Intelligence Corps. I am proud to have been selected by Major General Parker to replace Command Sergeant Major Robert H. Retter.

CSM Retter has gone to Fort Leavenworth to be the CSM of the Combined Arms Center. He was the CSM here at the Home of Military Intelligence for four years and was the first Sergeant Major of the MI Corps. He was instrumental in the consolidation of all the MI MOSs into one Advance Noncommissioned Officer Course and the formation of the MI NCO Academy. CSM Retter, the MI Corps thanks you for leading its NCOs "Always Out Front."

I am not unfamiliar with the Intelligence Center and School. From February 1984 to May 1985, I was the CSM of the 2nd School Battalion here and then the CSM of what is now the 111th MI Brigade (Training) until May 1986. Of my 28 years in the Army, I have spent 17 years in Military Intelligence. Since June 1986 I was the CSM of the 66th MI Brigade in Munich, Germany. Earlier in my Army career I spent a little over 10 years in Special Forces and the Infantry. My background in MI is that of a counterintelligence agent with assignments in both tactical and echelon above corps units. My awards include the Combat Infantryman's Badge, the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal with 2nd Oak Leaf Cluster, the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal and the Humanitarian Service Medal. I am a graduate of the third Advance NCO Course held here at USAICS in 1973 and of the Sergeant Major Academy. I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Liberal Arts.

Last year's Army theme was "Training." It is so fitting that the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army have selected this year's theme to be the "Year of the NCO." The NCO has always had

the primary mission of individual training of the soldier. In 1989 we want to recognize the accomplishments of the NCO throughout history; however, we must also explore ways to improve training and keep pace with the demands of the future battlefield.

In May of this year the senior NCO leadership in Military Intelligence from all over the world met here at the Home of MI to explore ways that NCOs and USAICS can positively impact on training. We encourage feedback on how USAICS and the Intelligence School at Fort Devens can train soldiers to meet the needs of the units in the field. CSMs will have the opportunity to share their units' initiatives in training with other units.

We will also focus on the Army's training doctrine found in Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force*. This field manual gives us the principles of training and underscores the role of NCOs. It leads us to what the NCO must be and do. NCOs must be able to train leadership and warfighting skills to their soldiers, evaluate training and counsel subordinates. FM 25-100 shows that we must recognize that we cannot attain proficiency to standard on every task, whether due to time or other resource constraints. Thus, battle-focused training is FM 25-100 doctrine. Battle competencies are expressions of training tasks and standards derived from focusing upon requisite warfighting skills. Using a battle focus to guide the planning, execution and assessment of training programs we can train as we intend to fight. During the conference we discussed the development of the mission essential tasks list from major command to company level. We talked about the selection of the individual skills that need to be trained to accomplish the mission essential tasks.

Tough, realistic, intellectually and physically challenging training both excites and motivates soldiers and leaders (FM 25-100). That should be our objective in our units and at the Intelligence Schools.

**LEAD BY EXAMPLE**



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
Captain John Vance  
Editor, Military Intelligence  
ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM  
US Army Intelligence Center and  
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Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000

Dear Captain Vance:

I have just completed my review of the January-March 1989 issue of Military Intelligence (PB 34-89-1). The best aspect of the publication was your letter as the new editor. I, for one, applaud and commend your "new approach." As one who has spent 27 years of a 35-year career in the military intelligence profession, I am convinced that our intellectual approach to the publication has left out the most important story of our time, that being the story about military intelligence soldiers. Certainly, in this the year of the NCO, we should focus on our NCO, their accomplishments, dedication, and professionalism. Every day in Forces Command, military intelligence soldiers do great things. They are our most precious asset and we ought to use the Military Intelligence publication to tell their story.

Thanks for telling it like it is in your letter. I wish you well in your endeavors.

Sincerely,

  
George J. Walker  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Director of Intelligence, J2

# editor's page

Hello, Soldiers,

This issue is a little closer to what I think the magazine should be. If you haven't read General Walker's letter on the preceding page yet, please look at it. I appreciate the back-pat, and will do my best to deliver.


It is extremely important that this be a soldier-oriented publication. "Professional development" covers many things. I don't pretend to know them all—but I don't write this book—YOU DO. In order to read the kind of well-written "MI SOLDIER" articles for professional development SOMEONE has to first write them. Look again at the writer's guide on page 1. That tells you what I want.

You, collectively, have enormous amounts of experience. Share it with the rest of us. Tell us an amusing anecdote. Tell us lessons learned. Old soldiers, tell us what the years have taught you. What went wrong? Right? The important thing is to write things that will help MI SOLDIERS to learn something. That is my purpose.

We are making changes in the subscription/distribution process. Too many of you receive your copy late or worse yet, not at all. There is no point in making a useful training tool and then failing to get it to the soldiers. We are working to fix that.




Let me remind you that the next issue will focus on the NCO in MI. What a terrific opportunity to tell the story of the "Backbone of MI." I should be able to include your piece if you get it to me before the third week in June. I'm thinking about an issue dedicated to training, and after that if I still have a job here, maybe cryptology. What do you think?

Soldiers, the best is yet to come. Keep reading. Keep writing.



John Vance, editor



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# feedback . . .

**"There are not many officers that are willing to 'fight city hall,' especially without hard evidence that they are**

**Dear Editor:**

Congratulations on another fine issue. (January-March 1989) I was particularly interested in the article, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Predictive Intelligence." The section on the Battle of the Bulge was even more fascinating, particularly one of the references, an article by Field Marshal Adolph G. Rosengarten. Captain Rosengarten was the First Army's Ultra Officer and was in the U.S. Army. I was never aware that Army Reserve officers ever rose to the rank of Field Marshal. The book, "The Ultra Americans" shows a photo of Rosengarten wearing a German uniform hat and a false moustache, mocking Hitler. I read Melvin Helfers' memo (Helfers was Patton's Ultra Officer) on his tour as an Special Liaison Unit (SLU). While not mentioning Rosengarten by name, Helfers indicated that most of the SLUs were slobs who would not impress anyone no matter what information they had. In a past issue of *Military Intelligence* there was a letter

to the editor which said the First Army had fired its G2 earlier for stating that the Germans had large armor units in the area. As the letter writer pointed out, it must have made for an interesting climate in the intelligence community.

Another interesting factor in the "Bulge" was the perspective of the war held in London and Washington. The war was almost over and the Germans were beaten and planning was for the postwar period. This attitude must have trickled down and was reflected in the SHAEF Intel summaries, especially those by General Siebert. There are not many officers who are willing to "fight city hall," especially without hard evidence that they are right. Another important factor was that the Americans had become dependent on ULTRA intercepts but most of the Ardennes planning was done in Germany using secure land communications rather than radio. The *Luftwaffe* was the outfit that was slipshod in its communication and it was from *Luftwaffe* transmissions that we got some indications.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) William L. Howard  
Largo, Fla.

Editor's Note: The promotion of Captain Rosengarten to Field Marshal Rosengarten was made by the printer who transposed Field Manual into Field Marshal and inserted it into the wrong reference. We thank you for the interesting additions to the "Bulge" article.

**Dear Editor:**

Please be advised that in the editing of my article, "Another Look at the Language Problem," in the October 1988 issue of *Military Intelligence*, an error in content was made in paragraph 5 when talking about the 501st MI Brigade's Command Language Program. While I don't have a copy of the original manuscript with me, I recall that the paragraph pointed out the successes of the 501st's program as well as the 109th MI Battalion (CEWI) Technical Certification Program. The editor perhaps thought that the 109th, located at Fort Lewis, Wash., was actually a subordinate of the 501st, located in Korea. Thus, calling the 501st's program the Technical Certification Program is in error and also fails to give credit to the great efforts of many at Fort Lewis who have established this unique program.

It would be greatly appreciated if you could publish an erratum in the soonest possible issue to avoid any hard feelings either in Korea or at Fort Lewis. Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.

Staff Sergeant Sydney A. Sellar  
109th MI Battalion

Editor's Note: Thanks for writing, Sergeant Sellar, to set the record straight. I wish nothing but the best for both units.

**Dear Editor:**

I read with interest the three articles on deception in the October 1988 issue of *Military Intelligence*. The most useful article was Captain George



Reed's on NTC operations. Though his examples are drawn primarily from his experiences on the OPFOR, they provide instances of how friendly forces can integrate some deception into their operations. However, some of his suggestions are off base, such as the use of sound tapes in the desert where even the most up-to-date PSYOP equipment cannot project sounds loud enough or far enough away to be effective because the terrain "swallows up" the recordings. Second, the OPFOR's deception techniques may work well against a U.S. force, but the same techniques would not work against the OPFOR. Providing decoys will not necessarily draw the OPFOR from their mission, for they only respond to effective fires, something even most advanced Tech base decoys cannot do. The lessons at the NTC may tell us more about ourselves than the enemy. Though specific examples of successful decoy deception at the NTC exist, they are more anomalous than we would like to admit.

Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Whittaker's article, "Battlefield Deception," highlights the importance of ensuring the commander fully supports the deception operation. However, the Army's response has been to provide an "element," at division and corps whose job seems to be to sell the commander and G3 on a deception plan. Deception should not be "sold" but, instead, must be an inherent part of every operation. The equipment in the field should support the commander's operation, not vice versa. For example, the presently fielded tank decoys are a maneuver battalion/brigade commander's assets, and, more often than not, the divisions have allowed

their deception elements to sign for the equipment, not the maneuver units. The maneuver commander's initial reluctance to become involved in deception will be in direct proportion to the division's participation in the program.

Whittaker's discussion of the deception support packages was imprecise. The Army has three basic packages of deception equipment. First is the "Family of Physical Deception Devices," broken into heavy and light division and a corps sets. False CUCVs, HMMWVs, 55-gallon drums and other decoys compose these sets. The second package

***"Deception should not be 'sold' but, instead, must be an inherent part of every operation. The equipment in the field should support the commander's operation, not vice versa."***

is the "Family of Electronic Deception Devices," which currently consist of VHF and UHF emulators. The final package is the Multi-Spectral Close Combat Decoys or MCCDs.

The articles hint at problems in current U.S. deception doctrine, yet none strike at the heart of the issue. The Army has not developed doctrine for each mission area (armor, infantry, air defense, etc.). Instead, the Intelligence Center and School has been burdened with the impossible task of

writing doctrine for other mission areas. USAICS may presently have proponentcy but has correctly argued it does not have the expertise to tell other mission areas how to perform deception operations. The present FM 90-2 represents a first cut at doctrine but fails to specifically address what deception can do for the maneuver commander and how the commander can and should doctrinally employ his assets, either independently or in concert with larger deception operations. Doctrine must be integrated into the Mission Area Analysis process, with emphasis on achieving a threat reaction. With the equipment already in the field, we will probably write doctrine to fit the equipment instead of understanding the battlefield requirements and then procuring equipment to fit them. Like the use of loudspeaker teams at the NTC, technological applications are not the whole answer.

Major James Koch is correct when he writes in his article, "The Monkey's Paw," that we do not address operational level deception. The Soviets see operational deception as a variety of cohesive operational security and tactically sound decisions. The Soviet's scientific method of writing strategy and tactics often easily impresses us with clear categorization of procedures in official training publications. Our thoughts, on the other hand, are scattered throughout military writings. This does not mean we do not think about or take deception seriously, but that we do not do so systematically. Preliminary evidence gathered by Rand's Arroyo Center at the NTC suggests that deception is integrated into successful NTC operations, while unsuccessful oper-

***"Doctrine writers should uniformly capture the data in a format that military planners find useful."***

ations rarely employ deception. A well-trained unit (be it battalion, brigade, division or corps) will more naturally include deception in its mission planning because the staff and commanders will see deception's utility. A poorly trained staff will probably not use deception because they will struggle with the more basic questions of command, control and the orders process. The key to successful operational level deception may be staff competency. Written doctrine is just a start, not an objective. Enough open literature exists to provide historical and current information on successful deception operations. Doctrine writers should uniformly capture the data in a format that military planners find useful.

A recent Fort Leavenworth publication on Soviet deception by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Armstrong alludes to what our doctrine writers must confront if the United States is to have a viable deception program. 1. Continuity: Tactical deception must be closely linked to operational deception. This has not been done. 2. Centralization: Deception is not necessarily tactical, but operational. The U.S. Army tends to give a tactical commander as much flexibility as possible, but successful deception operations require centralized planning. 3. Detailed planning with a clear

understanding of the multidisciplinary threat collection effort. 4. An allocation of at least 10 percent of forces for "animating" the deceptive target. A battalion or brigade commander may not have the assets to provide this animation, but division, corps and army commanders do and should be prepared to make the sacrifice. 5. Intense monitoring of the deception plan from the planning headquarters.

The second shortcoming is the Army's failure to support a long term commitment to the program. Due to funding constraints, TRADOC and AMC want to purchase deception equipment over a short period of time and then stop procurement. This position prevents modernization of deception equipment to pace changes in U.S. material, yet reflects the Army's cursory interest in equipment for which no doctrine exists. Though we may buy M1 decoys now, we will not have the funded program to buy either additional or new tank decoys in the future.

The bottom line is this: In increasingly tight budget years, if deception is to survive it must be firmly grounded in doctrine and have the backing of all major operational and support commands.

**Captain Justin L.C. Eldridge**  
Woodbridge, Va.

**Dear Editor:**

The article, "Nachalnik Razvedki: The Red 'Two,' in the January-March 1989 issue of Military Intelligence, is very well written on the duties and responsibilities of the chief of reconnaissance or the Second Section. However, I believe that the most serious flaw in Lieu-

tenant Colonel Armstrong's article is the absence of the many significant intelligence contributions made by the Soviet partisan movement to Red Army successes on the battlefield.

Organized, trained and equipped by the Soviet national command authorities, the Soviet partisans were used to engage in the extensive and numerous sabotage, assassination and hit and run operations that we usually attribute to guerrillas. However, because the partisans very often operated in areas along German Army main supply routes, they were also instrumental as a conduit for the collection of many types of tactical and operational intelligence information needed by the Red "Two."

The partisans were, in fact, a very serious military dimension to almost all of the major German Army operations in the Soviet Union. The German high command was, in many cases, forced to divert large numbers of well-trained infantry and motorized rifle divisions badly needed at the front to launch major antipartisan operations and reconquer their own rear areas.

To have omitted the value of the Soviet partisans from the intelligence makeup of the Red "Two" was to negate a very important source of human intelligence for the Red Army. In addition, our own forces could be vulnerable to these same activities should we have to engage in combat operations within the borders of the Soviet Union.

**Michael S. Evancevich**  
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

***"Information does not  
magically appear  
because we will it."***



## **Principles of Reconnaissance**

by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall

War in the future will be highly lethal, fought at selected locations and will terminate quickly. Such characteristics will pressure commanders to make quick and correct decisions. Information, a critical aspect of obtaining an advantage over an opponent, will provide a potential edge, a key for understanding the environment and the capability to apply combat power successfully.

Information does not magically appear because we will it. To get it, we must contend with our own limitations, distance, terrain, weather, communications and often an intelligent and interactive opponent. The U.S. Army needs tactical reconnaissance operations to produce accurate, relevant information. With such information commanders can effectively focus combat power.

The soldier and strategist, Henry de Jomini understood the importance of collecting information when he wrote: "When he (the commander) has opposed to him a skillful, active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect riddle, then his difficulties begin."<sup>1</sup> This statement is as true today as it was when Jomini wrote it. Today's commander must have a well-conceived reconnaissance plan and must show initiative, aggressiveness and perseverance in pursuing it. But this plan must be focused; otherwise, it becomes ineffectual when the efforts of scarce resources are diffused.

We must remember several important points about reconnaissance.

- \* We need information, and to conduct combat operations without it is grossly negligent.

- \* We do not need all information nor perfect information.

- \* We must focus only on the information we consider essential to the end.

- \* We must focus, within constraints, our means of collection to gain the maximum knowledge and understanding we believe necessary.

- \* We receive only bits and pieces of information even under the best of circumstances. We must develop the intellectual capability to put these bits and pieces of information together into a meaningful whole.

- \* We must recognize the numerous distortions that can occur in receiving and processing information.

- \* We must recognize that the enemy's information gathering system is able to conduct effective deception.

If we understand what information we need in an unconstrained environment, and if we have the means to obtain it, we can theoretically obtain highly accurate information. But, unfortunately, constraints exist. In a combat environment, the enemy is a principal constraint. The enemy anticipates, then attempts to deny our attempts to obtain information. A further complicator is that while the enemy attempts to gain information, we seek to deny those attempts.

Although difficult to do, we have to keep enemy efforts to gain information in mind while we attempt to collect information about him. We often forget the

devastating affects enemy information gathering can have on military goals. We can go back to World War II and Ultra to see a graphic illustration of those affects. At the National Training Center (NTC), we can see the results of OPFOR's information gathering to appreciate its significance at the small-unit level.

In its efforts to collect information, the U.S. Army uses technology in a variety of ways. With imagery intelligence (IMINT), we can see, with some constraints, events as they are happening or have recently occurred. With signals intelligence (SIGINT), we hear the enemy's communications (communications intelligence (COMINT)), locate them with radio direction finding (RDF), or detect their radars (electronic intelligence (ELINT)). Our machines and technology are well-suited for revealing physical types of enemy activity. We can locate, sometimes with astounding accuracy, artillery firing (shooters) and radars emitting and radios transmitting (emitters). These capabilities stretch vertically from the divisional Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Battalion to national intelligence agencies.

While we must use technology to its fullest, we must not be lulled into an overreliance on it; we must be aware of its limitations.

- \* Machines can only collect what information is available to them. Collection often depends on human error.
- \* The quality and timeliness of technological intelligence collection often depend on volatile and uncontrollable weather and terrain variables.
- \* Machines are "dumb" and can be fooled, thus delivering inaccurate information.
- \* Technology cannot provide the shade, hue and ambiguity inherent in information associated with the world of intelligent human beings.

People involved in reconnaissance and intelligence collection need sharp minds; they cannot let themselves sink into mental atrophy from an overreliance on mechanical wizardry. Machines will never be able to replace the human mind and its capacity for discerning subtle relationships or for developing meaning out of seemingly disconnected bits of information. Mental processes are the key to effective and efficient information collection.

Equally important as collecting information is deciding what information is needed, then focusing our efforts to collect it. In essence, we must be able to think about our information needs, the means to collect the information, and what we hope to do with the

information once we have collected it.

Our information-gathering efforts are irrelevant unless they revolve around the commander's concept of operation. His concept provides direction and focus for all members of the combined arms team.<sup>2</sup> The commander first assesses what information is available and provides initial guidance, including prioritized information needs, to his staff. He explains his concept of the operation and how the combined arms team should obtain the tactical or operational goal.

Principles of reconnaissance can assist good thinking about how and where to focus information collection. Principles are neither dogma nor are they unchanging. They simply aid thought processes, particularly during emotional or physical stress.

Principles help us think about the theoretical ideal — constraint analysis then brings us to an approximation of reality. Principles point us in the right direction. In a relational sense, they help us contemplate what our opponent is attempting to do. Principles provide conceptual bounds for our thinking. We can rest assured that principles generally are situationally independent — they apply in radically different situations. But we must always apply judgment; otherwise, we become slaves to words.

Commanders and staff officers can use the following principles to assist in planning reconnaissance operations.

#### **Information must be timely.**

Outdated information is merely historical data useless for making immediate decisions. The timeliness of the warning to Admiral Kimmel and General Short just before the attack on Pearl Harbor is a good example. What could they have done differently if the information about an impending Japanese attack had been timely? Perhaps they would have discarded the information as irrelevant or unreliable, but perhaps they would have moved the fleet to sea and manned their aircraft and antiaircraft guns. Perhaps the United States would have won the war at Pearl Harbor rather than suffer a devastating and humiliating surprise attack.

There are several aspects of information collection that cause the information to be delayed:

- \* Multi-layered bureaucracy. Generally, information is recorded, processed, analyzed and turned into a report before dissemination. As a result, timeliness often suffers.
- \* Analysis time. Analysts have to check, cross check and think. Although computer data bases help speed the analytical process, it still takes



time. The result can be historical, not timely, information, meaningless to the tactical commander.

- \* Environmental constraints. Atmospheric or enemy interference might disrupt collection efforts and communications.
- \* Human error. People can fail to recognize critical data, be indecisive about presenting thoughts, forget what is important to whom or be unaware of the importance of the information.

Tactical commanders need information timely enough to kill the enemy's soldiers or to destroy his equipment. In an engagement or battle, the lower a soldier is in a tactical organization, the more critical timeliness is. At the squad, platoon and company levels, events proceed quickly; therefore, information is relevant only to the extent that soldiers have only a few seconds in which to make a decision and to act. At the division level, the targeting system must act quickly to focus lethal and non-lethal weapons because information about the enemy is often short-lived. The battlefield at corps level and above becomes more detached from reality in that maps, computers and reasoned decisions take the place of hurried battlefield conditions. The enemy often becomes real only to those on the ground, not in the mind of the planners

and operators. Timeliness at the division level is measured in minutes as opposed to seconds prevalent at lower tactical levels. Corps and higher headquarters often plan several days in the future. Therefore, these echelons are concerned less with precise and timely information than with comprehensive information that helps discern patterns, objectives and possible courses of action.


**Principle 2: Reconnaissance operations must be aggressive.**

Aggressive reconnaissance operations are absolutely critical for achieving and retaining the initiative. Along with aggressively pursuing information comes risk to soldiers and machines. Reconnaissance is an interactive duel — a subset of combat. The struggle is for the most timely and accurate information. Pursuing information aggressively enables commanders to obtain information necessary to retaining the initiative. Those who possess initiative have the potential to win.

**Principle 3: Reconnaissance operations must be continuous, seeking information 24 hours a day, seven days a week.**

Leaders from the squad to the army level must plan and execute reconnaissance operations continuously. If our leaders let down even for a moment, the struggle for information — control of initiative — could

***"Machines will never be able to replace the human mind and its capacity for discerning subtle relationships or for developing meaning out of seemingly disconnected bits of information."***



swing back to the opponent. Traditionally, the U.S. Army has not done well in night reconnaissance operations. But, thanks to new technology and our experiences at NTC, we are showing improvement in this vital functional area.

**Principle 4: Reconnaissance operations must focus combat power.**

Reconnaissance operations "pull," so to speak, maneuver, fire support, and movement, and must provide information for fighting smart and in concert with the precepts of maneuver warfare. To borrow from B.H. Liddell Hart, "Reconnaissance operations gain contact with the enemy and find weaknesses and vulnerabilities to strike, using an indirect approach, at the enemy's soft spots."<sup>3</sup> Reconnaissance operations gathering information vital to the commander's intent focus on the enemy's centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities or high payoff targets (HPT). But, we have neither the reconnaissance assets nor the combat power to find and to destroy all enemy activities.<sup>4</sup>

For years we have neither properly recognized the viability of tactical reconnaissance operations nor integrated reconnaissance operations into our concepts of operations. These problems are apparent in our failure to train our soldiers to conduct adequate tactical reconnaissance operations. Responsibility for correct focus and desired information is often diffused. Reconnaissance assets are often assigned roles other than reconnaissance. Too often troops go through meaningless motions of information collection resulting in an attempt to find and kill everything rather than that which is important to the enemy commander.<sup>5</sup>

**Principle 5: Commanders need relevant information to make good decisions.**

Relevant information is, by definition, accurate and reliable. Correctly focused information-gathering activities help bring the individual closer to reality. A paraphrase of Mao Tse-tung's thoughts says, "The data gathered by observation and from reports is carefully appraised; the crude and false discarded; the refined and true retained... A careless one bases his military plan upon his own wishful thinking; it does not correspond with reality; it is, in a word, fantastic."<sup>6</sup> From this we can conclude that we must use relevant information to make decisions; otherwise, we run the risk of fueling our own fantasies with irrelevancies.

**Principle 6: The most effective reconnaissance operations are secret.**

Secrecy is an intangible but powerful weapon.

When we conduct reconnaissance operations secretly, our opponent does not realize that we know where he is and what he is doing. Secrecy in reconnaissance operations provides the commander with a powerful option. It enables him to make decisions that anticipate and manipulate the enemy commander. If, on the contrary, reconnaissance operations operate without regard for secrecy, they lose any advantage surprise offers. What enemy wouldn't respond differently if he recognized the opponent was aware of a course of action?

In essence, the thrust of all countermeasures (active) operations is to deny enemy commanders information and to destroy the enemy's potential for obtaining information without our knowledge. The NTC offers ample proof of a substantial advantage to the side that obtains information secretly and uses it to catch the opponent by surprise. At the NTC, the dynamic among the forces of reconnaissance is at its most apparent.

**Principle 7: Reconnaissance operations must provide accurate information.**

This principle does not advocate a requirement for perfect information, but for information as accurate as its intended use dictates. Information to direct artillery and close air support, for example, must be highly accurate. Criteria for accuracy fuses with the requirement for the information to drive collection. Commanders must select reconnaissance assets accordingly.

Those who collect information must be aware of three factors that can often distort it. First, technological limitations cause distortion; machines cannot be perfectly accurate. Moreover, collection machines can be fooled. Errors in computer software can generate and transmit false data. Second, natural elements such as clouds, precipitation and atmospheric conditions can affect information-collection efforts and provide a false picture, or no picture, of enemy activity. Even the source providing information can cause distortion if the machine is not in good repair or if it is used improperly. Third, we need to be aware of the foibles of the human mind that can cause inaccuracies and distortion when interpreting information. No matter how objective a person tries to be, subjective assessment most often rules. Countless conditions, ideas, prejudices, fantasies, emotions, experiences and values distort information. During battle, intelligence analysts and commanders are even more susceptible to distortion because of the passions inherent in war.

Information for fire and maneuver decisions must have accuracy enhancers. For human reconnaissance assets, enhancers promoting accuracy come from

***"Tactical commanders need information timely enough to kill the enemy's soldiers or to destroy his equipment."***



training (tactics, organization, doctrine, enemy equipment) and raw intellectual capability. Accuracy enhancers for mechanical means of reconnaissance are part of the system itself, e.g. lens, microchips, computer logic, man/machine complimentary interface, machine/machine complementary interface, and noise filters. Moreover, the receiver of information must be aware of distortions the collector, environmental conditions and receiver cause.

**Principle 8: Reconnaissance operations must be complementary.**

Accuracy dramatically improves if the means of collection complement each other. Each collection asset has strength and weaknesses. Often the strengths of one asset complement the weaknesses of another. Balance is the key. Leaders must plan and conduct reconnaissance operations to balance and complement each other.

Along with assisting in the quest for accuracy, complementary information collection assets help reduce the potential for deception. If we rely on one means of information collection, we stand a good chance of being deceived — the enemy probably has a good understanding of what we rely on as decision-making information.

The great risk is that we could waste time being indecisive while waiting for systems to complement each other to produce "completely" accurate information. But we reduce the risk when we attempt to obtain balance in information collection by understanding that perfect information is unnecessary, timeliness is critical.

**Implications**

Winning war in the future demands effective reconnaissance operations. We understand how

much the Soviets, and other antagonists, rely upon reconnaissance for their decision-making. We have seen the tremendous benefits of reconnaissance at the NTC. Yet, according to a recent Rand Corporation study, the U.S. Army is weak in reconnaissance operations.<sup>7</sup> We neither teach nor practice reconnaissance adequately in the field.

We need information to apply combat power effects to win engagements, battles and campaigns. Attaining that end results from successful decision-making which comes from two sources. The first source is a basic understanding of the art and science of war at appropriate levels of command. Second, successful decision-making comes from applying judgment to timely, accurate and relevant information. But, what is relevant, timely and accurate depends on the information's purpose, means of collection, and how we analyze, synthesize and disseminate it.

We have to determine how we should make decisions, what information we need (not merely want) for making decisions and how much distortion occurs during the input cycle. We have to determine how long collecting, processing and using information takes, and understand what distortions occur.

The Soviet's highly structured model for decision-making enables them to define their information needs, the means of moving information, constraints to perfection and how information gets into their decision cycle. With such rigidity, they define explicit roles and requirements for their reconnaissance assets. However, they exhibit a distinct lack of creativity, discomfort with ambiguity, overreliance on quantification and susceptibility to deception through manipulation of decision-making variables.

This enables an opponent to make fairly accurate assumptions about manipulating information for purposes of deception.

The U.S. Army, on the other hand, has no defined structure for decision-making, leaving it to individual commanders. The variety of methods is often a result of not knowing what our informational needs are, not understanding how we do and should make decisions, and not understanding how we think. This lack of uniform methodology provides confusion within the U.S. Army. Fortunately, it causes even more confusion for an opponent trying to get inside our decision cycle.

Commanders must determine their needs for information and make those needs known clearly and concisely to their subordinates. Such information requirements are the basis of developing priorities for information collection. In theory, subordinates should know and understand how their leaders think to understand informational needs.

But leaders sometimes have difficulty understanding their own way of thinking, let alone defining their information needs. The resulting desire for all information diffuses organizational resources and subordinates' intellectual efforts. We have neither the intellectual energy, the collectors nor the processors to collect and process everything, nor do we have any reason to do so.

## Conclusions

Information gathering is hard, demanding work. Even then, we can only hope to obtain bits and pieces of information which we must analyze to provide relevance and judgment.

There are several activities that must be performed well in order to gain the most rewards from information-gathering operations:

- \* Define what information is relevant to the operation.
- \* Be comfortable with having only partial information (ambiguity).
- \* Understand that even highly accurate information probably has flaws.
- \* Use the human mind to its fullest rather than expecting answers from machines.

Today's officers must understand how they and their subordinates think. Leaders should attempt to balance the capabilities and talents of all individuals. In the stress of battle, we need complementary thinkers to work together toward the commander's goal. We require balance in intellects on staffs, in

selecting collectors and in exploring the dynamics of interaction between ourselves and our antagonists. We need to emphasize principles of reconnaissance in our doctrine. We must teach them to our young officers and practice the principles in the field. Only through such understanding and practice can we gain the balance we need to collect relevant, accurate and timely information.

Using principles of reconnaissance helps us plan and execute our reconnaissance operation. These principles, though, are merely aids to thinking. We, the officer corps, have to do a better job of thinking about information — how we collect it, how we process it and turn it into something meaningful, and how we use it to achieve a desired end-state. If we fail to focus our efforts, while relying on machines to collect everything, we are at great risk of failing in future combat operations.

## Footnotes:


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**Editor's note:** See Field Manual 34-80, *Brigade and Battalion IEW Operations*, April 1986, for current planning considerations.

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*A proper reconnaissance  
might have saved the  
7th Cavalry, but...*



# CUSTER DIDN'T LISTEN

by First Lieutenant Steven J. Martin

On the afternoon of June 27, 1876, Lieutenant James Bradley led a detachment of 23 Crow scouts up the Little Bighorn River. Behind him was a force of over 1,000 infantrymen and cavalrymen under the command of General Alfred Terry. Terry was attempting to trap a village of hostile Sioux between himself and the 7th Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer. Terry had received reports from some of Custer's scouts that there had been a large battle the previous day, and the soldiers had been destroyed. Although he was doubtful that the 7th had been wiped out, it was obvious that there had been some sort of fight, and all had not gone well for Custer.

As Bradley hurried south along the river, he found 7th Cavalry equipment strewn among the remains of an Indian village. This indicated that at least some of what the scouts reported earlier was true. From a ridge along the east side of the river, he could see what looked like the remains of some slaughtered buffalo on a hillside. Their white meat was shining through the haze of the 100 degree heat. As Bradley moved closer, however, it became obvious that the objects were not buffalo carcasses but the naked and mutilated bodies of the men of the 7th Cavalry.

A quick survey showed about two hundred bodies on the hillside and in the immediate vicinity. All the

bodies were stripped and were covered with arrows. Many bodies were cut open, and others had their skulls smashed by war clubs. The stench of the rotting bodies was almost unbearable.<sup>1</sup>

Bradley was the first white man to see the site of "Custer's Last Stand." Custer had led the 665 personnel of the 7th Cavalry against the largest concentration of Indians ever to assemble in North America. The battle cost the lives of Custer and 271 of his men and became one of the most discussed engagements in American military history. Although the battle occurred over 100 years ago, it still contains lessons for today's intelligence officers, especially those at battalion and brigade levels.

June 24, 1600 hours. Mid-afternoon of June 24th found Custer near the headwaters of the Rosebud River, approximately 30 miles from the Little Bighorn. He had been detached from a larger force headed by Terry. Custer's mission was to swing south of a large band of Indians and prevent their movement to the Bighorn Mountains while the larger column under Terry moved from the north down the Bighorn River. The Indians would thus be caught between the two columns and given the choice of annihilation or surrender.

Preceding the 7th Cavalry was a detachment of Crow and Arikara scouts under the command of Lieutenant Charles Varnum. Since the Crows knew the terrain, Mitch Bouyer, a half-breed, led six Crows

about 10 miles to the front. Two groups of Arikaras followed, scouting each side of the Rosebud River. Lonesome Charlie Reynolds, a local woodsman, and a black man named Isaiah, also rode with the scouts.<sup>2</sup>

This scout organization was fairly typical of those used at the time. Maps of the area were rare and inaccurate,<sup>3</sup> and commanders had to rely on local Indians to act as guides and interpreters. They were the eyes and ears of the Army, and their daring and bravery under fire is well-documented. The differences in cultures between the scouts and the white soldiers they fought alongside caused some problems, but the Army effort against the hostile Indians of the plains would have been severely crippled without them.

The scouts were on the trail of a hostile band of Sioux and Cheyenne Indians, who were traveling a few days ahead of them. What they found was very disturbing to them. Custer, along with the rest of the leaders on the mission, was initially told that there were not many warriors in the field, and those that were, were not united. He believed that no more than 500 warriors were scattered about the Bighorn Mountain area. He was therefore prepared to meet a small force of warriors, who would naturally try to break contact and escape. This turned out not to be the case. On a scouting mission prior to Custer's detachment from Terry, Major Marcus Reno came upon a large Indian trail. The scouts reported that the Indian band was too large for Reno to handle. Custer scoffed at the notion of any number of Sioux being too large to handle. He quickly moved south to follow the trail. The trail was one mile wide where it crossed the Rosebud River, and the scouts estimated it was made by 1,500 lodges or approximately 4,500 warriors.<sup>4</sup> The scouts had also come across the remains of a village where the Sioux had left signs that they had prepared strong "medicine" and could not be defeated. The scouts indicated that if the cavalry did not find the Sioux, the Sioux would come after the cavalry — a tactic almost unheard of in the Indian Wars.

The scouts were correct. At that spot, approximately two weeks earlier, the Sioux and Cheyennes had held a Sun Dance, the most sacred of their religious ceremonies. The Sioux medicine man, Sitting Bull, had been ceremoniously tortured and he had lost a great deal of blood. He then danced the entire day while staring into the sun. He danced all night and into the next morning until he fainted from exhaustion. When he awakened, he told of a vision in which he had seen white soldiers falling into the Indian village. The vision's meaning was clear to all — the Indians were about to fight the white man and the Indians would have a spectacular victory. This vision greatly increased the confidence of the warriors, who looked

forward to the coming battle.<sup>5</sup>

### **Mistake #1**

As the Indian trail was found, it became obvious that there were thousands of Indians on the warpath. Custer amended his estimate of the number of Indians in the field somewhat (he now felt there might be up to 2,000 warriors) but still held firm to his belief that the Indians would run when they saw the cavalry. He still believed the real challenge of the upcoming fight would not be to destroy the enemy in battle but to catch him as he ran.

Custer initially developed an enemy "template" and probable course of action based on the information known when he left Fort Abraham Lincoln in North Dakota on May 17th. His mistake was that he failed to reassess this estimate in the light of increasing evidence that he was off the mark. The number of warriors in the field was of little importance to Custer. He believed the 7th Cavalry could defeat the entire Sioux Nation by itself. The bigger village simply meant more glory should he succeed in capturing it.

Custer's poor understanding of the enemy's strength and intentions caused him to misjudge his probable course of action. This was a major error which would have a large impact on the decisions made in the next 24 hours.

June 24, 2200 hours. Believing that he was closing in on the Indian village, Custer ordered a night march. He hoped he would be able to observe the camp the next morning. The decision to attack or wait would be made at that time.

There was no moon on the evening of the 24th. The 7th stumbled through the night with the soldiers often falling asleep in their saddles. The evening was filled with the sounds of tin cups banging together, the pack mules braying and the soldiers' curses as they bumped into each other. The soldiers had been in the field for over a month and after the hurried pace of the last few days were mostly concerned with their own comfort and when they would return home. At daybreak, they had reached the foothills of the Wolf Mountains, some 15 miles from the Little Bighorn, and made camp.<sup>6</sup>

The noise the regiment made during the evening's march could be heard for miles, just as the smoke of their campfires could be seen for miles. They had made contact with some Sioux hunting parties in the morning and there was little doubt that the 7th Cavalry's presence was known by the Indians. Custer ordered Varnum, Bouyer, Reynolds and four Crows to some high ground (called the Crow's Nest by the Crows) to see if they could observe the village.

### **Mistake #2**

The Army's combat experience came out of the Civil War. Officers were used to an OPSEC posture

that permitted clanking cups, braying mules and camp fires. Commanders had been successful in the Civil War using a certain set of methods and they saw no need to change when confronted by a group of "barbarians." Only the scouts seemed to have any appreciation for proper OPSEC. They were rarely discovered and were usually able to approach close to enemy villages undetected.

Custer realized that the enemy was probably aware of his presence. Much of his reasoning would be based on the fact that he had been compromised. He would have preferred more time to rest and recon, but he was forced to attack to catch the village before it began to break up. Thus the poor OPSEC posture of the soldiers forced Custer into a course of action he would have preferred to avoid and helped create the conditions which allowed the Indians to defeat him.

June 25, 0600 hours. From the Crow's Nest, the scouts could see the Indian village. It was huge. The ground was white with tepees and the pony herd covered the hills behind the village. Bouyer had been among the Sioux for 30 years, and he had never seen a village so large. It was truly an awesome sight.<sup>7</sup>

However, by the time Custer climbed the hill to look, haze had obscured the village. Bouyer assured Custer that the village was out there and he described its immense size.

Custer had a major decision to make. He could move in on the village, or he could wait, rest his men and conduct further reconnaissance. Actually, Custer was not sure how many villages there were, nor was he entirely sure of the reported village's location since he could not see it for himself. It is possible here to observe the effects of the previous errors in intelligence. Based upon the facts that the cavalry's presence was known and the incorrect estimate that the Indian village would scatter when the cavalry approached, Custer decided that it was necessary to close with the village. To wait would allow the Indians time to scatter and the moonless night would make tracking difficult. Custer felt that he had no choice — he had to move in closer to the village or risk losing it entirely.

Unsure as to what Indian force may exist further south and remembering his mission to deny enemy movement in that direction, Custer ordered Captain Frederick Benteen to take three troops and move southwest. Benteen was told to "pitch into" anything he came across.<sup>8</sup> Custer took the remaining nine troops and the pack train directly west, toward the reported location of the Indian village.

### Mistake #3

A good reconnaissance of the objective is essential to any offensive mission. Custer's only knowledge of the enemy came from a sighting at a distance of 15 miles. He had no clear picture of the actual number of

*"The noise the regiment made during the evening's march could be heard for miles, just as the smoke of their campfires could be seen for miles."*





warriors he would face, how they were arrayed (for example, was the camp just one large camp, or several small camps which could be defeated separately), and he had no idea if there were other camps in the area which could support the village. Also, he had no detailed terrain analysis. He did not know if the terrain would support or hinder his maneuvers or even if an attack against the village in its present location was possible. All of these questions could have been answered with a good reconnaissance and surveillance plan. If such a plan had been executed, Custer would not have been forced to detach one quarter of his combat power to get the information while he was advancing against the enemy.

June 25, 1300 hours. Custer had taken the remainder of the regiment to a spot approximately two and a half miles from the village. There, against a bluff, a funeral tepee held the body of a warrior killed while fighting in the Battle of the Rosebud on June 16th. A debate over how the Indian was killed was interrupted when a scout named Fred Girard yelled down from the top of the bluff: "There are your Indians, and they're running like the Devil!"<sup>9</sup> Custer looked in the direction Girard pointed and could see dust at the mouth of a creek leading to the Little Bighorn. What Girard saw was 40 Indians moving for the security of the village. Girard took the running Indians to be a sign that the entire village was beginning to scatter. In fact, the village was not breaking up, and it had no intention of doing so.

Concerned that the village was scattering and that time was now of the essence, Custer ordered Reno to take three troops and move down the creek and attack the village from the south. Custer told Reno he would "support him with the whole outfit."<sup>10</sup> Custer then left one troop with the pack trains for security and took the remaining five with him north, in an attempt to hit the north end of the village while the Indians were preoccupied with Reno in the south.

#### **Mistake #4**

It was the mission of the scouts to be the eyes and ears of a unit, not its brain. The scouts should have only reported what they saw, they should not have interpreted the information. Girard should have reported that he had seen dust and approximately 40 Indians moving north. By reporting as he did, Girard gave Custer the impression that approximately 5,000 men, women and children were packing up their belongings and moving away with all of their stock. Obviously, this was not the case. Once again, Custer committed his forces based on erroneous information.

#### **Mistake #5**

This error is similar to Custer's failure to reassess

the enemy's probable course of action. Custer had been receiving reports for several days on the immense size of the village he was following. There were ample signs indicating that the Indians had every intention of fighting the soldiers. However, Custer chose to ignore all of these signs which conflicted with his assessment of the situation and listen to the one spot report which confirmed it. He should have realized at this point that something different was happening. Instead he let a single report drive his entire scheme of maneuver.

June 25, 1530 hours. Reno was now in a difficult situation. He had charged the village on line and had made contact with the Indians about 500 yards from the southern end of the village. He quickly dismounted and formed a skirmish line as the Indians began to mass against him. The Indians soon turned his flank and he chose to withdraw to a timber line which ran along the river banks. There were approximately 800 warriors facing Reno's 150 men, one quarter of whom were now occupied holding the horses. The Sioux set the grass on fire and waved blankets in an attempt to stampede the cavalry's horses. Sioux and Cheyennes were in the timber and were again flanking the soldiers. Reno decided that he could not hold his position and chose to withdraw across the river to some bluffs on the opposite side. The withdrawal quickly turned into a rout, with every soldier fighting for himself. When the men finally arrived at the hilltop, they were exhausted and had 30 percent of their numbers missing or wounded.<sup>11</sup> Reno ordered them to dig in.

Meanwhile, Custer continued to ride north. He rode to the top of the bluffs and could see Reno beginning to engage the Indians below. He could also see most of the camp and could see that it had not started breaking up. Custer was pleased to see this and was certain of victory. He rode back behind the bluffs until he came to a coulee which led to the river. He took this coulee, thinking that he would strike the village's north end. He actually hit the village in its middle, and there were approximately 1,500 Indians under the war chief, Gall, to meet him. Outnumbered almost six to one, Custer fought a withdrawal to some high ground in the northeast in the hopes that he could hold off the Indians until relief came from Reno, Bennett or even Terry.<sup>12</sup>

#### **Mistake #6**

Custer's plan was to move north and attack the opposite end of the village. He had no idea if the terrain supported his plan. The coulee he eventually took could not be seen from where he originally made his scheme of maneuver. He had no idea if there was any way to approach the village further north. He assumed that there was. A proper reconnaissance



would have let him know exactly what routes were available to him.

Custer was incorrect when he thought he would arrive at the northern end of the village because up to then no one had seen the entire village. There was still one half to one mile of the village to the north of Custer when he reached the river. Custer's plan was based on guesswork. When contact with the enemy was imminent, guesswork should not have been necessary. Custer should have known the exact location of the village, how many warriors he was facing, what they were doing and what the terrain was like in the area. He knew none of these things as he made his decision to break off Reno and move north. Custer's hurried approach and refusal to conduct a proper reconnaissance resulted in a poorly-planned attack which did not support Reno and had little chance of success.


June 25, 1630 hours. Custer's five troops continued to move northeast, conducting an orderly withdrawal under fire. They were taking heavy losses, but the command was well-organized and should have been able to gain some high ground to their rear and organize a defense. Custer had sent word to Benteen to

come quickly, and probably was expecting him to arrive at any moment. He planned to hold the hill with as many people as he could and wait for reinforcements. It was at this moment that an additional 1,000 Indians under Crazy Horse crested the very hill Custer was moving toward.

#### **Mistake #7**

Just as reconnaissance of the objective is critical to the success of any attack, continued reconnaissance during the fight is crucial. After realizing he could not continue his attack, Custer had chosen a piece of high ground to anchor his defense. At this point, all of his scouts were dead, fighting or had been ordered by Bouyer to leave the fight. Custer had no one available to recon the hill and the ground on the other side. This lack of reconnaissance allowed him to be surprised by an unexpected attack by Crazy Horse. This was not necessarily Custer's mistake, but a flaw in doctrine. Scouts traditionally stopped their reconnaissance when contact was made. This practice severely hurt Custer at a time when he was trying to extract his command from a desperate situation.

***"The number of warriors in the field was of little importance to Custer. He believed the 7th Cavalry could defeat the entire Sioux Nation by itself."***



## Summary

The resulting fight was short and violent. Pressured from the front and from the rear by an enemy outnumbering them almost ten to one, Custer's command was overwhelmed and destroyed in 20 to 30 minutes. No soldier lived through the fight. Most of the Indians now turned south to deal with Reno while the remainder stayed behind to loot and mutilate the bodies of the dead soldiers.<sup>13</sup>

Reno had since been reinforced by Benteen, who had realized that he was on a fruitless mission. He had received word from Custer to come quick. Failing to find him, and coming upon Reno's desperate situation, Benteen chose to remain on the hill with Reno.<sup>14</sup> A troop eventually moved north to regain contact with Custer, but could only see Indians. These were the same Indians that had just defeated Custer and were moving south to Reno. The troop withdrew under fire and rejoined the Reno defense.

The men remained on the hill for the rest of the day and the following night. They would have almost certainly been defeated if Terry's column had not approached from the north.

Elated with the greatest victory ever known against the white man, the village moved south to the Bighorn Mountains and began to break up into dozens of smaller villages. Benteen would later remark that the village had looked like a fully-outfitted cavalry division, the likes of which he had not seen since the Civil War.<sup>15</sup>

Once united with Terry, the remaining commands arranged a hasty burial of the dead. They were buried in shallow graves where they fell. An attempt was made to identify the remains of the officers, but the enlisted remained anonymous. The commands then moved north with the wounded to the Yellowstone River, where a steamboat waited to take them back to Fort Abraham Lincoln. The news of the defeat soon spread to a stunned America that had never imagined such a defeat was possible, especially with the Army's most famous Indian fighter in command. The battle quickly became the subject of much talk, speculation and controversy and has remained a major event in American military history.

Custer and the men of the 7th Cavalry made numerous mistakes during the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Those of an intelligence nature have been discussed here. All of these errors are directly applicable to today's Army, and much can be learned from them:

- \* The 7th Cavalry's poor OPSEC procedures allowed the enemy to follow them from miles away and forced Custer into a course of action he normally would not have chosen.

- \* There was no reconnaissance of the objective. Because of this, Custer had a poor appreciation for the terrain and for the enemy dispositions. He was forced to detach one quarter of his combat power to

conduct a reconnaissance in force to ensure the command was not surprised because the enemy situation was not completely known.

- \* Custer allowed one "spot report" which confirmed his opinion of the situation and ignored dozens of reports to the contrary.

- \* The scouts interpreted what they saw instead of simply reporting it. Their interpretation was incorrect and contributed greatly to Custer's flawed scheme of maneuver.

- \* Custer's analysis of combat information during the battle was poor. He did not realize that the enemy was not reacting as he had expected them to, even when he could observe their camp for himself.

- \* Custer failed to conduct reconnaissance during the battle. He therefore did not know the size of the enemy village until his forces were committed, nor was he aware of Crazy Horse's movement north to deny him the high ground he desired.

The single fault which most affected the outcome of the battle was Custer's unwillingness to modify his assessment of the enemy's probable course of action. He remained convinced the Sioux would try to scatter and would not change his mind despite dozens of signs to the contrary. The key to being successful in predicting an enemy's course of action is maintaining an open mind and trying to realistically assess the situation. Custer certainly did neither of these things in the days and hours prior to his battle at the Little Bighorn. This contributed greatly to his failure.

## Footnotes:

1. Evan S. Connell, *Son of the Morningstar* (San Francisco, Calif.: North Point Press, 1984).
2. Edgar I. Stewart, *Custer's Luck* (Norman, Okla.: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1955).
3. *Ibid*, p. 179.
4. *Ibid*, p. 259.
5. *Ibid*, p. 262.
6. *Ibid*, p. 273.
7. Connell, pp. 269-270.
8. Stewart, p. 317.
9. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Crazy Horse and Custer* (Garden City, NY, Doubleday and Company, 1975).
10. John S. Gray, *Centennial Campaign* (Fort Collins, Colo.: The Old Army Press, 1976).
11. *Ibid*, p. 296.
12. Ambrose, p. 440.
13. Stewart, p. 397.
14. *Ibid*, p. 390.
15. *Ibid*, p. 428.

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# The Rand Study and Scouts at the NTC

by First Lieutenant John McCain

The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif., is the peacetime Army's battleground. This is where we test and train our soldiers, leaders and doctrine against what may be the best "Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment" in existence. Often, BLUEFOR rotations end in disappointment and defeat at the hands of the enemy. There are many reasons why this happens, and one of them is because reconnaissance elements fail to provide good intelligence to their unit. However, we cannot blame the scouts for reconnaissance failure. We must, instead, improve our scout doctrine.

The 1987 Rand Study shows that good intelligence almost always leads to mission success. The study also shows that our scouts are poorly equipped, undermanned and not given enough time to do their job. The correlation between reconnaissance and mission success is high. Battalions and brigades that go into battle with detailed and precise enemy locations almost always win. The problem is that our scouts often fail to provide this information. The reason they fail is that they are often unable to report enemy positions or are killed before they can make their reports. Why does this happen?

The OPFOR wins at the NTC because they know the terrain and can develop good intelligence about the BLUEFOR. The OPFOR scouts and the Deep Reconnaissance Teams usually report over 90 percent of friendly vehicle positions before an attack, and they track BLUEFOR movements perfectly when the OPFOR defends. The OPFOR commander relies heavily on his S2 and the scouts before he makes any decisions that effect the outcome of a battle. He is almost never blind. Obviously, the OPFOR scouts hold a distinct advantage over their BLUEFOR counterparts. They know the terrain and train 14 times each year. But let us concentrate on the friendly scouts. Why don't they do better at the NTC?

The Rand Study says that our scouts fail because they use the wrong vehicles. Scouts in the Bradley engage the enemy more often than they should, and the M113 and M561 are poor scout vehicles. The Bradley gives the scouts improved firepower, but scout platoons equipped with them seem to do more fighting and less scouting. The study shows that scouts die over 70 percent of the time when they engage. The Bradley encourages bad habits, and scouts mounted in them want to use its firepower.

Bradley-equipped scout platoons don't dismount

often enough. The only way to penetrate the OPFOR's main defense is to dismount, hide and report. When scouts use this tactic they are successful and give detailed information about the enemy. Bradley scouts often fire when they should run, and ride when they should dismount.

A third reason that scouts don't do well at the NTC is that they don't have enough people. Rand suggests that the scouts need ten more people to be effective. I wholeheartedly agree. No one works harder than the scouts during NTC rotation, but one officer and 29 soldiers are not enough to do what the scouts should do, especially during continuous operations. A 40-man platoon would make a huge difference in their performance. The scouts could dismount more people, still maneuver their vehicles and work longer hours.

The scout platoon leader also needs more time to plan and execute his mission. Information about the next mission almost never gets to the scouts fast enough. This causes the platoon leader to lose planning and preparation time and results in poor performance. The scouts must be the first element told about a mission. A quick PRAGO will do. Just get the scouts out front where they belong. The Rand Study says that OPFOR scouts are often already positioned before BLUEFOR scouts receive the next order. This usually means defeat for the friendly force.

What we need to do is rethink and overhaul scout doctrine. The scouts need a mix of tracked and wheeled vehicles. A platoon of four Bradleys and four HMMWVs could be the answer. This type platoon could conduct reconnaissance much better than the current configuration. The Bradley can overwatch the HMMWV while it moves forward. In front of the wheeled vehicles could be dismounted patrols collecting terrain information. Scouts do their work at night, so we also need to develop thermal sights for the HMMWVs and observation posts.

We need to make major changes in our scout platoons. The NTC results show that our scouts have the wrong vehicles, not enough men and not enough time. We must change scout and reconnaissance doctrine if we want better intelligence. This could make the difference between victory and defeat in combat.

First Lieutenant John McCain wrote this article while attending the Military Intelligence Officer Advance Course at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Ft. Huachuca, Ariz.



# The Army's Soldier-Statesmen

by Major Robert B. Adolph Jr. and Major Steve L. Neely

Since America's birth, the officer corps of the U.S. Army has served well in the traditional role of warrior in the defense of the nation. For the country's first 150 years that was enough. Since World War II, and America's entry into the international community as a world leader, more demands have been made on the officer corps than ever before. Due to the nature of the post-World War II world, many of those demands require as much political insight as tactical competency. The Army's recognition of the need for officers who were equally at home with diplomacy as well as traditional soldier skills led to the creation of a formal program to identify and train soldier-statesmen. The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program is the Army's way of developing and using these exceptional soldiers.

Scholars have long studied the relationship between foreign policy, defense policy and international affairs. Foreign policy is the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies designed to achieve national objectives in the international environment. A sound foreign policy based on clear goals that recognizes political and military capabilities and constraints contributes to success in international affairs.

National objectives that consider the political and cultural realities of the international community result in foreign and defense policies that have a reasonable probability of success. Regional expertise is essential to the successful articulation and application of these policies. This requirement provides the philosophical justification for specially educated regional experts. Modern American presidents, aware of the unique character of the military perspective, and the necessity to incorporate it into the formulation of the country's foreign policy, have sent Army officers into foreign lands to evaluate, recommend and execute U.S. foreign policy. President Franklin Roosevelt relied on General Joseph W. Stilwell to pursue our China policies with respect to Chiang Kai-Shek. Stilwell, who spoke Chinese and knew China culturally, politically and militarily, was a valuable asset in analyzing and conducting America's China policy prior to and during World War II.

General Douglas MacArthur served under Presi-

dent Truman as "Viceroy of Japan" and combined his vast experience with oriental culture and his political insight to lay the foundations of the modern Japanese state in the ashes of Imperial Japan.

In 1937, when he was a junior officer, General Maxwell Taylor, was called to serve Stilwell in China. Later, Taylor became the Army's attache in Japan. Because of his expertise in Japanese affairs, he went on to serve in a variety of assignments. He became the Army Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then ended his government career as ambassador to the Republic of South Vietnam. He epitomized today's Foreign Area Officer (FAO).

Lieutenant General Sam Wilson is another classic example of the soldier-statesman. He served with distinction in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, where he was the Defense Attache in Moscow. Later he was Deputy to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and was subsequently named to a ministerial position in the Republic of South Vietnam. Wilson later served as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. His education, linguistic abilities and experience contributed immeasurably to successful U.S. political-military affairs for over 33 years.

Perhaps the best known actively serving soldier-diplomat is Lieutenant General Vernon Walters who has served his nation under six presidents. Because of his versatility in languages, he served in a variety of military attache and political-military positions in Europe and Latin America. He is currently the American Ambassador to the United Nations.

Though these men were not FAOs, they made significant contributions to national security and are examples that today's FAOs should copy. It is precisely this type of soldier that the Army has attempted to train since the end of World War II. The evolution of formal foreign area training began in 1947. In an effort to train officers capable of forming sound intelligence estimates or rendering proper command decisions, the Army created the Language and Area Training Program (LATP) in 1950. This program included training of one to two years in CONUS institutions and one to two years of study abroad. Generally, the first year was devoted to language study which led to political, economic, sociological and other graduate level studies at Columbia, Yale, Princeton or Stanford.



When the emphasis shifted to the intelligence aspects of the program in 1953, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 assumed responsibility for officer selection, and attendance at the Strategic Intelligence School was added to the training program. With these changes, the program was renamed Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST). This program emphasized training to fill Army needs only.

In 1960, a major shift in emphasis from the intelligence to the operational aspects of training occurred. During the 60's, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel assumed sponsorship of the program. There was an increase in the languages and areas studied as well as in the number of CONUS university training sites. Both Vietnam and the Brezhnev Doctrine of supporting "wars of national liberation" worldwide spurred further evolution with their demand for military assistance officers. This demand led to the creation of the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). The MAOP was a supplementary program to FAST because of its similar but less demanding training program. General William C. Westmoreland combined the MAOP and FAST in 1972. He wrote that, "both programs were concerned with developing top-quality officers to serve worldwide in command, staff, advisory and attache positions requiring area expertise, language proficiency, socio-economic and political awareness in addition to a sound professional background."

The FAO Program officially began March 6, 1973. The objective was to "produce qualified officers for assignment to DOD and DA positions requiring language proficiency, detailed knowledge of foreign areas, political-military awareness and other specialized skills relating to the FAO program." The training program included attendance at the Foreign Area Officer Course at Fort Bragg, advanced civilian schooling, language training and one year of training abroad.

### Today's Program

Since those first steps, the program has evolved significantly. In 1985, the Army Chief of Staff approved an FAO development enhancement plan. The plan calls for an introductory course for all FAOs followed by language training at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. After successful completion of language training, officers attend selected universities in the United States to obtain graduate degrees in area studies. The final phase of training before becoming a fully-qualified FAO is an in-country training tour, usually of one year's duration. During the in-country training, FAOs attend foreign schools and travel in the region to study the language and culture.

Attache positions are normally associated with

and filled by FAOs, but there are numerous other jobs available for these highly trained officers. Some of these positions can be found in the National Security Council; the State Department; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Department of the Army staff; Defense Intelligence Agency; Joint Chiefs of Staff; on other joint, specified and unified command staffs; and in military assistance groups worldwide. In addition, FAOs perform instructor duty at the U.S. Military Academy, the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, the National Defense University and in the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

### Conclusion

The legacy of the FAO is impressive. The contemporary role the FAO fills is vital. Although best described as a soldier-statesman, the FAO's special emphasis is in the military arena. FAOs are not foreign service officers. They are Army officers who serve in military assignments which require an understanding of U.S. foreign policy, international affairs, the language and culture of a particular region, international economics, security assistance and political-military affairs. This unique and exciting program is one of the most sought after and prestigious in the Army.

Today's FAOs are on the cutting edge of policy-making and in many far-flung posts, policy execution. Their contributions to the nation greatly outweigh their small number. The corps of Foreign Area Officers that the Army is building today is an integral part of America's political-military policy formulation process. With a view toward the future, the need for soldiers of their caliber will be great.

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# Force Protection

by Captain Manuel A. Rodriguez

After an uneventful flight from Panama, I stepped onto the tarmac at Palmerola Airbase, Honduras. I was there to fill a slot in the J3 shop that called for an Infantry major who spoke fluent Spanish. I was an Armor captain who hadn't spoken Spanish in a long time. Obviously I was the right man for the job. All those things I learned at Fort Knox and in the field at Fort Hood (like gaining and maintaining contact, or firing first and early) didn't seem to apply to my new job as the Force Protection Officer at Palmerola. I had a lot to learn — fast!

## Force Protection

Force protection is a combination of base defense and site security. Simply stated, this is how we protect our base camps, work sites and field hospitals from attack. It is a way of preserving our capabilities; of protecting our forces. At present we are using force protection in a low intensity conflict posture. But, it also relates to high intensity conflicts. The same principles apply whether you secure a base camp in Honduras or you defend the Brigade Support Area at NTC. During the Vietnam conflict most soldiers had a pretty solid understanding of base defense. Today it is sort of a lost science.

The major threat that we face in Honduras are small, 3-5 man teams, who are well trained and heavily armed. A good base defense plan keeps this threat in mind. Pay special attention to high value targets like aircraft, POL sites and living areas. I guarantee you, that if you don't take care of these areas, the enemy will! The provost marshal and the base engineers are your best sources of information and ideas, so work with them as much as possible when designing a new base camp.

The four components of a good base defense are: detecting the enemy before he attacks, assessment of the people detected (friend or foe), delaying the enemy until your defense is ready and your response to the attack.

## Detection

Detecting the enemy before he attacks is the hardest part of base defense. Backup your detection plan with sensors, K-9 teams and roving patrols. If you have helicopters available, use them to circle the base just before dark. The pilots can observe off-base areas without putting a man on the ground.

Guard towers posted along the perimeter will give you the best visibility. Clear an area 50-100 meters

around the perimeter to give each tower a clear view outside the wire. One camp in Honduras is set up next to a coffee farm. In order not to destroy the coffee plants we were forced to allow the trees within 10 meters of the fence line. We solved this problem by clearing an observation zone inside the perimeter. Clearing an area inside the perimeter also gave us intervisibility, which is as important as visibility as it lets you see anyone who may have already gotten on base.

Night sights belong in each guard tower. The best night vision device I have seen is the AN/UAS-11A thermal light. It is similar to the M-1 tank thermal sight and can detect dismounted personnel out to 1,500 meters. Rain, dust or fog will not affect the AN/UAS-11A the same way as they affect passive sights. Night vision goggles are the next best devices, although in my opinion they do not have the range or clarity of the Starlight scopes. The main advantage of night vision goggles is that it is easier for a guard to strap a set to his head and use both eyes rather than sight through a rifle-mounted scope all night long. Finally, searchlights mounted on the towers are a good psychological device and will deter untrained soldiers. However, a well trained attacker will find a way around the searchlights to target your towers.

At Palmerola there is a swampy area on the western side of the perimeter. To cover this dead space we used remote battlefield sensor systems (REMBASS). The Provost Marshal's office monitored the sensors

## Assessment

Assessment is nothing more than making a quick judgement whether the people detected are the enemy or civilians going about their legitimate business. In countries where there is no curfew, there can be a sizeable group of civilians walking around at night. If you decide that the people you've detected are the enemy, your next job is to determine their armament. It'll make a big difference to the team you send out whether the enemy has a couple of rifles or machine guns and RPG-7s.

You need a good communications system to properly assess targets. All U.S. manned towers on Palmerola had radio communications with the Provost Marshal. All Honduran manned towers had field phones connected with their guard station, where we kept a liaison. Always ensure that your communications system has a backup.

## Delay

Concentric rings of defenses are the best and most efficient way to delay attackers. You must determine the time it takes for your troops to arrive at their fighting positions. This is the length of time that your guards will have to hold the attackers. Your delaying plan can't have any holes in it for the attackers to get through. If there is one hole they will find it and use it. If all of your defense forces are not in place it may fall on one or two soldiers to hold the enemy.

Fences are only a delaying mechanism. A six-foot perimeter fence with a one-foot top guard of razor wire or concertina won't stop attackers from getting in. The enemy will try to bypass the towers and positions on the perimeter as fast as possible to destroy your high value targets.

Have a series of fighting positions within the circle of guard towers manned by Quick Reaction Forces (QRF); small, highly mobile teams on alert 24 hours a day. They should be equipped with jeep-mounted machineguns, grenade launchers and radios. Five minutes is as long as it should take for the QRF to be in place.

When sharing a base, it is wise to divide the areas of responsibility between the host-nation forces and U.S. forces. This eliminates a lot of confusion. On Palmerola, the United States defended the east and the west sides of the base, and the Hondurans defended the north and south perimeters. Use separate routes for the QRFs to move into position. This prevents accidents; in the dark one group of armed men looks like another.

The inner ring of defenders can be divided anyway you want as long as you maintain control. Build bunkers to protect people who are not actively engaged in the defense. All of your fighting positions must have interlocking fires. Each fighting position has to have two armed soldiers, while the bunkers need two or four armed guards. Obstacles are the best way to tie your inner defenses together. Barbed

wire is useful for canalizing foot soldiers into your kill zones. We used a device called the "King Tut" barrier to prevent truck bomb attacks. These barriers have two concrete cylinders (three by four feet) with a steel loop imbedded in the top. King Tuts are placed on either side of a road and connected with a 3/4-inch steel cable. A King Tut can cut a 5-ton truck, traveling at 25 mph, in half.

## Response

Your response forces must be fast, flexible and in enough numbers to seal off the base, if needed. When planning your response, balance mobility against armaments. The best way to move your forces into position is by jeep or a flatbed truck. This way, the soldiers have a clear field of fire if they need it. If no truck is available, plan for a longer delay. Radio communications are very important in controlling your response forces. If you send the soldiers to the wrong part of the base, or can't control their deployment, they are useless.

## Conclusion

While the possibility of an all-out war in Europe is pretty remote, low intensity conflict is becoming a real probability. You must have an understanding of force protection before you get orders to a low intensity conflict area. After your aircraft hangar goes up in smoke is too late to start planning your defense.

*Captain Manuel A. Rodriguez was commissioned from the Univ. of Southern Mississippi. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course and the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course. He served as a tank platoon leader and tank company XO with the 2/8 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Rodriguez was also the Assistant Brigade S4 and Assistant Brigade S2 with the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood. He was the Force Protection Officer at Palmerola Airbase, Honduras. He is now the Squadron S2, 1/11 Armored Cavalry Regiment.*

## The 1988 Military Intelligence Writer of the Year...

is Captain Mary S. Brennan who wrote "The Bolivian Connection," (April 1988).

A panel of five senior officers from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. made the selection based on originality, style, scholarship and overall appeal.

The authors nominated for the 1988 award were: Douglas H. Lincoln, "Intelligence Processing — the ASAS Connection" (July 1988); Captain Brian R. E. Miller, "Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence" (October 1988); Major Donald R. Cook, "The Army Intelligence Master Plan: A Path to the 21st Century" (January-March 1989); and Major Neil D. Bute and Major Paul C. Topalian the at-large nominees for "Technological Transfer and National Security" (April 1988).



# COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS—

## *The Rest of the Story*

by Lieutenant Colonel Bob Hunt

I applaud the efforts of Major E. H. Coet for his thought provoking article titled "Counterintelligence Analysis — The Untrained Discipline," which appeared in the October 1988 issue of *Military Intelligence*. Coet's absolutely correct assertion that the lack of credible CI analysis is a dangerous void in our intelligence effort warrants further discussion and analysis. My purpose in writing this article is to begin telling the rest of the story about counterintelligence (CI) analysis.

### Point/Comment

Let's begin by taking a closer look at Coet's comment about the current credibility of our CI analysis effort and then move along to other major points made in his article.

**Point:** "The lack of a well guided, dedicated and highly skilled CI analytical effort represents a dangerous void in the overall intelligence effort at any echelon of command."

**Comment:** No doubt about it. Few would argue that in wartime, a sophisticated enemy SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT threat could literally shut us down before the first battle, and that countering these threats must be a very high priority. In peacetime, however, it is difficult for commanders and staff officers to deal with these relatively elusive, misunderstood, underdeveloped, complex disciplines. In a success-oriented environment, there are few rewards for coming to grips with multidiscipline tactical CI. Rather, countermeasures and negative consequences for this type of threat are viewed primarily as inconvenient potential disruptions to the otherwise smooth flow of exercise events and a "successful" conclusion to the exercise.

**Point:** "CI analysis has been and remains a fragile discipline...especially at echelons corps and below."

**Comment:** True. It is fragile, in part, because the doctrine is incomplete. One measure of the doctrinal underdevelopment associated with multidiscipline tactical CI is the content of the latest coordinating draft (November 1988) for Field Manual 34-60, *Counterintelligence*. Out of 634 pages, only 25 are devoted to multidiscipline CI analysis. There is a striking imbalance in text devoted to the three CI disciplines: Six pages for counter-imagery intelligence, 41 pages for counter-human intelligence, and 113 pages for counter-signals intelligence. There are more pages in the glossary than there are in the counter-

imagery portion. The number of pages devoted to report formats (139) and security manager inspections (33) exceeds the total number of pages devoted to counter-HUMINT, counter-IMINT and counter-SIGINT. Also, multidiscipline tactical CI analysis is a fragile discipline because there are too few qualified CI people working on the multitude of obstacles which inhibit progress, particularly at echelons corps and below. And, there is too little support from commanders and staff officers.

**Point:** "While there is interface between the CI analysis section and the G3 OPSEC section, the latter does not...contribute to the work of the CI analysis section."

**Comment:** Disagree. There must be a very close relationship between the CI analysis section and the G3 OPSEC section. In effect, the CI analysis section works for the G3 OPSEC section. It is the analytical arm of OPSEC. It provides threat data for OPSEC. It works with OPSEC to do friendly force profiles. It collaborates with OPSEC in the development of countermeasures. G3 OPSEC is a focal point where CI and operations intersect. The CI analysis section brings the CI part of OPSEC to life. The interface between the CI analysis section and the G3 OPSEC section is absolutely critical to the multidiscipline tactical CI process.

**Point:** "...only the intelligence analyst and perhaps the CI analysis officer have any analytical training or experience. None of the section personnel have CI-specific analytical training or experience...The CI technician...is not trained as an analyst (and) knows little about the other MI disciplines (counter-SIGINT, counter-IMINT)...There is not a single question about multidiscipline CI analysis on any 97B SQT."

**Comment:** The lack of formal training or experience in either tactical analysis or multidiscipline CI, much less multidiscipline tactical CI analysis, is definitely a significant handicap for most CI soldiers who end up in CI analysis sections. Effective tactical analysis requires trained and experienced personnel. Most, if not all, soldiers in CI analysis sections have no training and very little experience in any type of tactical analysis. The fact that 97B SQTs do not even address multidiscipline tactical CI analysis underscores the weak institutional, doctrinal and operational support for tactical CI analysis.

**Point:** "CI analysis sections tend to expend many manhours building data bases...but spend too little time analyzing the impact of enemy capabilities."

**Comment:** Without solid, relevant computerized



data bases from which we can extract information in an efficient and timely manner, there can be no tactical analysis of value. We must build our data bases with more urgency and more efficiency than we have in the past. We must have the data bases so we can be as smart and creative as possible in writing OPLANS, coming up with threat assessments and incorporating multidiscipline tactical CI play with the mainstream of tactical exercises.

**Point:** "Some G2s, G3s and commanders...infrequently...inquire as to the enemy's perspective concerning friendly forces."

**Comment:** This is true because "how the enemy sees us" is a more difficult, less easily measured concept than "how we see the enemy" for most commanders and senior staff officers who obviously have many pressing matters demanding their attention. Subjects such as CI, OPSEC, rear operations and deception are among the easiest to avoid because they generally have low visibility during exercises. They are subjects most of us are still not comfortable with. There is seldom any pay-off or recognition for success in these disciplines during exercises, and they may even be viewed by some as potentially disruptive to a neat and "successful" exercise finish. A recent experience provides a good example of how this mentality works. A young, energetic captain made a special effort to put together a thorough and workable plan for CI and rear operations play during an exercise. Corps' staff principals expressed concerns regarding a shortage of controllers (i.e., other exercise disciplines have a higher priority), the difficulty of how to deal with attacks in the rear area which might result in vehicles not moving and "real world" hungry soldiers, and the fact that since other units participating in the exercise would not have rear operations play, the Corps might be put in the position of having a self-inflicted disadvantage (the concern about a "successful" finish).

**Point:** "Recommended solutions: a graphic CI summary...CI Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield...commanders and intelligence professionals need to recognize that an 'intelligence void' exists...act to fill that void...ask the 'tough questions'...assign to the CI analysis section trained, quality soldiers...replace the 35E analysis officer position with a 35A/35G position...and most importantly, more extensive CI analysis doctrinal guidance must be developed and CI analysis training must be provided to all personnel assigned to CI analysis duties."

**Comment:** Graphic CI summaries, CI IPB, asking tough questions, quality soldiers, adjustment to tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and improved doctrinal guidance are elements of the solution. The critical task, however, is to focus our efforts now on building the foundation for this "untrained discipline." We must develop relevant, efficient and accessible

computerized data bases; computerized friendly force profiles; and train our CI people to do multidiscipline tactical CI analysis (more on this later). Once we build the foundation, we can increasingly shift attention to selling the merits of creative, useful multidiscipline tactical CI products to commanders and staff officers. We can devote more effort to refining our TOEs and our doctrine which should evolve somewhat naturally as we build on the foundation.

**Point:** "The CI analysis section has an analytical mission and does not conduct CI agent operations. Moreover, experience gained in a CI analysis section will not contribute to the basic skills required of a CI agent."

**Comment:** While the CI analysis section does not "conduct CI agent operations," it does have, according to current doctrine, one very important function which Coet neglects to mention. That function is management of the CI mission which, of course, is directly related to CI agent operations and the development of basic CI skills. According to Field Manual 34-25, *Corps IEW Operations* (page 6-10), the CI analysis section "manages the CI mission for the G2. This includes mission management of CI support to OPSEC, rear operations, deception and terrorism counteraction. Source control and approval of CI specialized operations, such as defensive source operations and tactical agent operations are handled according to FM 34-60A. CI missions are passed to the CM&D section for tasking to the MI brigade. Requests for EAC support are also sent through CM&D channels." This management function clearly adds another significant dimension to the current responsibilities of the CI analysis section. However, in my judgement, this management function does not belong there but with the Corps' Counterintelligence Staff Officer who, according to Field Manual 34-25 (page 2-12), "supervises the CI analysis section of the CTOC support element."

**One Final Comment:** I found it interesting to note that Coet wrote extensively about CI support to OPSEC. "CI analysis section duties and responsibilities include providing its products to the OPSEC staff element to assist them in performing their OPSEC management responsibilities...preparing appropriate portions of CI/OPSEC documents such as plans, estimates, annexes and other related documents...the CI analysis section is frequently called upon to support and provide services to the G3 OPSEC section." CI analysis supports OPSEC. Of course! Who could argue that point? And yet there are only a few sentences in either the February 1988 or the November 1988 version of Field Manual 34-60 that even superficially mention OPSEC or CI support to OPSEC. Virtually ignoring the subject of OPSEC in the single resource for "how to do CI" is yet another manifestation of the weak doctrinal base

for multidiscipline tactical CI.

### How To Overcome The Obstacles

I will conclude with two proposals for tackling the obstacles we face in making counterintelligence analysis all it can and must be. If we are to be successful in convincing commanders and staff officers that multidiscipline tactical CI analysis is indeed a critical and workable combat discipline, and if we expect to see multidiscipline tactical CI analysis more in the mainstream of our preparation for war activities, we must gain the support and professional respect of those commanders and staff officers the old fashioned way. That's right, "we have to earn it."

Obviously, we need more appropriate TOE structures, improved doctrine and better analytical products. But what we really need at this point is to concentrate on the basics of developing the multidiscipline tactical CI capability. We need to have the data bases for threat analysis. We need to develop friendly force profiles so we can do vulnerability analysis. And, most basic of all, we must come up with multidiscipline tactical CI personnel who have the training and experience to do the job.

I see two possibly complimentary, mutually supporting ways to create trained, experienced multidiscipline tactical CI personnel.

First of all, we have to get serious about establishing multidiscipline tactical CI curriculum at USAICS. I'm not talking about inexperienced instructors with virtually no tactical background, bright as they might be, getting up in front of a classroom and expounding on often confused and underdeveloped doctrine during a mere 10 hours or so of insipid platform instruction. I'm talking about instruction the way students are taught in the Combined Arms and Services Staff School and at the Command and General Staff College: Instructors fresh from battalion and brigade commands, guest speakers, visiting experts from the field and frequent, realistic training exercises. I'm not saying that everything taught at USAICS should be taught in the Leavenworth-style. I'm saying that certain subjects must be taught in a more dynamic, creative and relevant way. Multidiscipline tactical CI is one of those subjects.

Even if we are able to come up with this dynamic, creative and relevant way to teach multidiscipline tactical CI, I confess that I cannot shake one major nagging doubt. I fear that CI agents (35Es, 351Bs and 97Bs) can never really get into doing multidiscipline tactical CI because unfortunately too few of them have any substantial experience in the tactical Army. They do not have that "down and dirty" feel for the tactical world which can only come from a primary and enduring association with the combat arms. Besides, unlike most tactical soldiers, CI agents have another professional world to contend with — the

world of strategic counterintelligence.

So, here's another idea. How about if we give the multidiscipline tactical CI training and jobs to our tactical intelligence soldiers and analysts (35Ds, 93As and 96Bs)? Heresy? I don't think so. After all, these are the people who spend most of their careers in the tactical world. They understand the basic elements of tactical intelligence analysis from corps to battalion level. Maybe they should be the tactical counter-HUMINT, tactical counter-SIGINT and tactical counter-IMINT managers and analysts working together with signals and imagery specialists in CI analysis sections at echelons corps and below. Meanwhile, let the tactical CI agents develop their warfighting skills in the CI teams which support divisions and corps, doing investigative work similar to what they do at the strategic level. If for some reason the CI analysis section requires special CI or HUMINT expertise, it could be provided by the Division CI Staff Officer, the Corps CI Staff Officer or someone in a CI team assigned to the division or corps.

Or perhaps there can be some mutually supporting combination of both approaches. We could have selected CI agents trained Leavenworth-style in multidiscipline tactical CI and assigned to CI analysis sections working alongside equally well-trained 35Ds, 93As and 96Bs to support the multidiscipline tactical CI mission.

### One More Thought

The title "Counterintelligence Analysis: The Rest of the Story" is clearly a misnomer. The rest of the story for CI analysis can never be written. We all know that. A friend of mine especially savors tackling difficult challenges, or as he puts it, "taking on more than I can chew and then chewing it." What we can do, now, is to keep on chewing. Who will step forward and chew some more?

**Editor's note:** The revised Field Manual 34-60, *Counterintelligence* is programmed for publication and distribution in September 1989. The revised Field Manual 34-60A, *Counterintelligence Operations(S)* is programmed for publication and distribution in June 1989.

*Lieutenant Colonel Bob Hunt, the son of a career Army officer, wanted to be a sailor. However, he became a soldier after graduating from the Naval Academy. Following several years in artillery, and after night parachute jumps, Chinese studies, and a week in Afghanistan, he found himself as the counterintelligence staff officer for I Corps at Fort Lewis, Wash. Hunt escapes the pressures of practicing multidiscipline tactical CI by playing bluegrass classics.*

# Winning the Commo Campaign

by Chief Warrant Officer Three Jim Hollaway

"Bravo Two-Three, this is Bravo Six, over. Bravo Two-Three, this is Bravo Six, over! COME IN BRAVO TWO-THREE! (Silence) Any station this net, this is Bravo Six, over!"

In frustration the operator bangs his fist on top of the right corner of the RT-524 and smacks the handset on the top of the wheel-well for good measure.

Does this sound familiar? More often than not, you can learn to avoid situations like this with just a little common sense and some planning on how to use your radio.

## Know Your Environment

There are a lot of strange things that happen inside your radio. For the most part, you don't need to know what all of them are. What you do need to know, or at least be aware of, is that there are more things that go on OUTSIDE of your radio that affect the quality of your transmission (what we in the business call the "go-zouta"). Some of the things that affect your radio have big words we call phenomena, like absorption, reflection, refraction, attenuation, propagation loss and interference. There are a lot of very technical things that cause these phenomena to happen, like weather, the ground, buildings and trees, and the terrain. We "trained intelligence observers" may not be able to do anything about the phenomena, but we do have some control over some of the things that make them happen.

I'm not going to go into all of the details of why these things affect your radio because unless you are an electronic design engineer, you could probably care less. What I would like to do is let you know that they are there and show you how you can overcome some of their bad effects — and use their good ones to your advantage.

## The Basics

You know the saying: "There's no free lunch." This applies to radio frequency (RF) energy much like everything else. If you transmit a signal (or power) through the air, there is a limited distance that signal can travel without being "eaten up" by atmosphere. This is called propagation loss or absorption and you can calculate the amount of power a signal will lose

over any distance. This is a formula to calculate the distance a radio signal can travel.

$$L_p = 32.45 + (6.6858 \times \log(D)) + (6.6858 \times \log(F))$$

Where:  $L_p$  = the propagation loss in db

$D$  = the distance in kilometers

$F$  = the frequency in megahertz

(The actual formula is a lot longer, but this is simplified and saves a lot of work.)

All of this sounds pretty good until you start plugging in some numbers and find out that, in theory, your RT-524 will transmit somewhere around 250 nautical miles and come in five-by.

If Columbus hadn't proven that the earth wasn't flat, this formula would probably work for us. But the fact is, the earth is round and we're not able to see over the horizon. Since most of our radios are line-of-sight (LOS) VHF transmitters, that means they transmit in a straight line, just like light.

It doesn't matter how narrow you make the beam of light, eventually it will get spread out, bounced around and disappear. If you happen to be behind a building or a mountain you'll never see it. The most important thing you must keep in mind when you plan your communications net is that the curvature of the earth is the biggest limit to LOS communications.

Fortunately, the curvature of the earth is the easiest thing to overcome to make your communications better. First you need to figure out what is the radio horizon. Because of some of the phenomena that happen to radio signals, the signals bend around the earth's surface somewhat. This makes radio waves, even LOS radio waves, "see" a little further than the optical horizon. To figure out the radio horizon, use the formula:

$$d = 4,000 (\sqrt{h_t} + \sqrt{h_r})$$

Where:  $d$  = distance

$h_t$  = transmit antenna height

$h_r$  = receive antenna height

NOTE: Use 7,245 instead of 4,000 if you want the distance in feet.

If you lie on the ground, you can't see more than 4,000 meters. But, if you stood on a 25-foot ladder you



could see five times as far.

$d = 4,000 (\sqrt{V_2} + \sqrt{V_1})$

$d = 4,000 (5)$

$d = 20,000$  meters

One other thing you should be aware of is reflection and how it can help you. In a nut shell, reflection says that there are two parts to any transmission. One part comes direct from the antenna and the other part comes from underground and reflects the real antenna. Both of these signals help each other to make the signal look stronger than it did with just the direct wave.

"So what?" you say. The one thing that has the greatest effect on reflection is the ground you transmit on. You can benefit by trying to transmit on solid or moist soil instead of sandy areas or around a lot of trees. It makes setting up a little harder and there's no place to hang your hammock, but it's well worth the effort.

Here are some other things that will help. If you're around a tactical airfield, try an apron of the polysteel plate runway. If your operation uses manpack or handi-talkie, try climbing up on top of a 2-1/2 ton-shelter or a tin-roofed building. You'll not only improve your antenna's ground plane but also increase the antenna height. Just keep in mind that once you've made your connection, keep it short and get off the air. The "bad guys" probably have that high ground already fixed as a target.

## Planning

Now that you have some of the basics, it's time to put your training to work. The next time you're getting ready for an exercise, break out a map of your area of operations and do some terrain analysis. Pick out some of the high ground that doesn't have hills between you and where you want to put your RATTs and retrans.

You can start by using the distance formula for the radio horizon and figure out what your maximum transmit distance is. Draw a circle that equals that distance and look over the terrain to figure out where would be the best place to set your teams. If there is higher ground between you and them, it's probably not a good spot to pick. There (of course) will always be times when you are on the move and won't be able to talk to anyone. However, the odds are better than 50-50 you will still be able to talk to someone on the higher ground.

## Preparation

*There is no substitute for training.* We've been told that for years. More simply stated, you have to know your equipment, what it can do and, more important-

ly, what it cannot do.

All of the manuals for the VRC radios give the approximate range for transmission at about 40 kilometers. In fact, if you do a little planning, training and preparation an RT-524 can give you dependable comms out to about 75-80 kilometers.

For training you might want to try a simple comms check. Send a team of two to three people to do a comms check at a remote area about 25 kilometers away. To make it a challenge, remove all the radios and crypto from their vehicle. Let another team deploy first with the gear and have it waiting for them when they arrive. The comms check team gets to install, check out and key the crypto to make contact and you kill five birds with one training stone:

- \* The operators become more familiar with their equipment.

- \* The operators do PM on their comms.

- \* The operators practice map reading (because you only gave them grid coordinates).

- \* You find out if your equipment is really working right and if you need more training.

- \* It's a slick way to get things done and it really doesn't take that much time.

The last part of planning is maintenance. Believe me, your maintainers would rather see you bring your vehicle and radio in for regular PMs than have to find you in the middle of a cold October night because you're lost and forgot to clean the handset plug before connecting it. Take the little extra time to make sure things are right.

As I've said, there are a lot of "gee whiz" technical things and some plain old common sense things that go on inside and outside of your radio that keep you on the air. All of the bells and whistles aren't important and, unless you're a "spark chaser," don't mean much to you. What is important is to keep in contact with your unit and the outside world. You might be the person who has to call the cavalry to the rescue.

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# Listening — Not Just a Matter of Hearing

by James Patterson

Do you remember where you were on January 28, 1986? On that day, a world-wide television audience watched in horror as the Challenger Space Shuttle blew up shortly after take-off. The government investigation of the explosion and deaths of eight crew members showed the pressure to launch interfered with the willingness and ability of launch officials to listen to engineers concerned with the safety of the spacecraft. A presidential investigative team later recommended that NASA develop plans and policies to improve communication (and listening IS communication) at all levels of the organization.

The Challenger tragedy highlights one of the biggest problems present in any large organization like the Army: few people practice effective listening techniques. What is listening? Most of us assume we know what listening is. You heard your boss's order, right? Well, hearing is only the first part of listening. When you physically pick up sound waves with your ears, you are hearing. But listening also involves the interpretation of what you heard. Then you must evaluate. This is where you weigh what you've heard and decide how you'll use it. Finally, based on what you heard and how you evaluated the information, you react. So a good listener hears, interprets, evaluates and reacts.

Because of our misconceptions about what listening really is, we end up doing a pretty poor job of it. Studies show we spend up to 80 percent of our waking hours communicating. At least 45 percent of that time is spent listening. Other studies have shown that immediately after a 10-minute oral presentation, the average listener understands, evaluates and properly retains only about HALF of what was said. Within 48 hours most people will normally retain only 25 percent of the original information they heard. This is a fact that provides a constant challenge for instructors training soldiers.

Another reason so many people are bad listeners is because of a lack of training. Consider the four major communication skills we use everyday: listening, speaking, reading and writing. Remember, almost half of our time awake is spent listening, yet it is the least taught communication subject. Did you ever take a college or high school course in listening? The most taught skill — writing — is used the least. Why hasn't there been much emphasis on listening training? Maybe because most of us, as I mentioned earlier,

assume we can listen because we can hear. Another common faulty assumption is that many people believe listening is beneath them; that the person with the power speaks. To that I reply with a quote from an unknown author. "Perhaps our maker gave us two ears and one mouth on purpose: so we would listen twice as much as we speak!"

Why should we care to become better listeners? Because, as the Challenger disaster shows, a failure to listen can cost *lives*. Think of the lives that have been lost on the battlefield just because soldiers failed to understand an order.

Listening mistakes also cost *money*. If every one of the 770,000 active duty soldiers in the Army made a simple 10 dollar listening mistake today, it would cost us almost \$8 million! Let's make a conservative estimate that most people make about two of these listening mistakes a week at a cost of over \$15 million. Taken over a year, simple listening mistakes cost us at least \$800 million.

Better listening can mean less paperwork. Most of us learn not to rely on giving information orally because of all the mistakes people make. The result is we "memo" everything. Just look at your desk. Couldn't some of that paperwork be eliminated by simply talking to another person? Yes, it could, if only you could be sure that the other person knew how to listen. This relates to another cost of poor listening. All of this added paperwork means we need more word processors, more secretaries' time and more file cabinets to keep all of the things we write down and get from others. We're not going to magically eliminate the paperwork problem in the Army overnight. But we can improve the situation if we all work to become better listeners. If you *must* write, just remember to follow the Army Effective Writing guidelines in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-67, *Effective Writing for Army Leaders* and Army Regulation 600-70, *The Army Writing Program* (writing that can be understood in a single rapid reading).

Supervisors should be interested in better listening because it will improve the flow of upward communication. There are a lot of ways an officer or NCO can send messages to the people who work for them but not as many ways the soldier on the line can communicate upward. The supervisor who doesn't know how to listen may find that few of his or her soldiers will talk freely. This causes poor morale and a lack of critical information the leader needs to make effective decisions. Even if the upward flow of communications

starts, one bad listener along the way can stop or distort the message.

Better listening also improves decision-making and problem-solving in conferences and meetings. This is easy to understand if you think of the reasons we hold meetings. We meet to exchange views, knowledge and expertise in order to solve problems. Good listening helps people understand other viewpoints. It also helps keep the group centered on the current issue and makes them less likely to wander off on irrelevant problems or concerns.

Before I suggest ways on how we can become better listeners, let's take a short test. Here are the rules. Read the following story once, and only once. (Don't cheat!)

You're the manager of a shipping department. One morning the mail brings orders for 25 items. The phone rings and a store orders 10 more items. The buyer from a department store phones and says his store is overstocked, please cancel his order for 20 items. The boss drops by and says 15 more items should be shipped to another customer. A salesperson comes in and orders 20.

Without looking back at the story, answer the following question: What is the name of the shipping manager?

How did you do? If you answered correctly, it's because you followed Rule 1 in developing good listening habits: you resisted distractions. The distractions in this story were all of the statistics! Other listening situations may call for you to look past a speaker's bad habits and concentrate on their ideas. By the way, the correct answer to the test is... **YOU**.

The Sperry Corporation, famous for their concern with listening (their corporate slogan is, "We Understand How Important it is to Listen") suggests ten ways to improve your listening ability.

1. Resist distractions.
2. Find areas of interest by asking, what's in it for me?.
3. Judge content, not delivery.
4. Don't be quick to argue or judge until you comprehend.
5. Listen for ideas and central themes, not just facts.
6. Be flexible in your note taking. Use different systems depending on the speaker or subject.
7. Work at listening. Show you are interested.
8. Exercise your mind by reading heavier materials sometimes. Don't feel you can challenge your mind by only reading light recreational materials.
9. Keep your mind open. Don't be so quick to react emotionally to trigger words.

10. Understand that you can think faster than you can speak. You must fight the temptation to day dream with slow or boring speakers. The good listener will mentally summarize, weigh the evidence and listen between the lines to the tone of the speaker's voice.

I'd like to add two more rules to Sperry's 10 rules of good listening:

11. If you're interested in having your people become better listeners (and I know you are), *ask for it*. Let your people know how important listening is. Ask for training to help you and your soldiers develop good listening skills.
12. If you ask for good listening, regard it. Make it a part of the evaluation process. Otherwise, nobody will take the importance of listening seriously. Here's a suggestion: After a conference, hold a listening critique. Ask each person to evaluate the listening attention he or she received while speaking. Each person should then evaluate their own listening performance.

Here's a story that shows the importance of good listening — and how a listening breakdown can **COST**:

A down-and-out drifter, hungry for something to eat and willing to work for his meal, walked up to a fancy house. He rang the door bell and asked the lady of the house for a meal in return for any household chore he could do.

"Well, certainly! There is a job you could do for me," the lady said. "Take those two cans of green paint around back and paint my porch."

"Be glad to, ma'am," said the drifter. Two hours later, the man returned to the front of the house and said, "Ma'am, I've finished the job and I'm ready to eat! Oh, by-the-way, that car I painted was no Porsche; it was a Ferrari!"

By now you should know the importance and payoff of having good listening skills. To improve your listening, you have to have a positive attitude and a willingness to work at it. Again, good listening is not just a matter of hearing.

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# Viewing Gorbachev from Inside and Outside

by General John A. Wickham, Jr.

On March 17, 1989, students and cadre of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School were privileged to have General (Ret.) John A. Wickham as a guest speaker. General Wickham, who retired in 1987, is currently the President of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA). He is a tremendous teacher and mentor. I had the pleasure of serving him as his G2 when he commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and profited immensely from his wisdom and concerned, involved leadership. Once again, I learned from him as he discussed the situation within the U.S.S.R. and China — insight gained while traveling to these countries as part of an official U.S. delegation last year. Because of the need for all intelligence soldiers to understand these important countries, particularly how Premier Gorbachev's policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* are affecting actual events in the U.S.S.R., I felt it appropriate to share General Wickham's insight with all who read MI Magazine. The text of his remarks follows.

Colonel John A. Pattison

A joke is going around about a discussion among Warsaw Pact dogs. The Hungarian dog asked his Russian friend how life is **changing under *glasnost* and *perestroika***. "Well," the Russian dog replied "our leashes and collars are as tight as ever, and food dishes don't have much more in them, but **what's new** is that we now can bark all we want to!"

There's some truth in this satire. Except in the military area where the Soviets continue to produce impressive results, their economy is a shambles. This explains why Gorbachev impatiently mandates reform, attempts to curb military spending, woos foreign governments for tolerance as well as financial help, and tells the West what it wants to hear.

## Gorbachev Inside

He's been leader four years, but Soviet citizens see few improvements except perhaps for being able to complain more in public. Their standard of living ranks 60th in the world, and life expectancy is declining. The U.S.S.R. cannot feed itself. Yet

Gorbachev's bid to make peasants "masters of the land" by offering leases up to 50 years meets indifference. Less than 2 percent of farmers appear willing to trade security of collectives for harder work and rewards of privatization. Some experts see this as basic societal weakness born of generations of repression: little initiative and capacity to respond to incentives. In contrast the Chinese have been very successful with agricultural reform and Gorbachev seeks to emulate their experience. With inflation running 10 percent, the U.S.S.R. faces an incredible budget deficit approximating 11 percent of GDP in contrast to the U.S. deficit which is less than 3 percent of GDP.<sup>1</sup>

We see further evidence of bureaucratic ineptitude in coping with the Chernoble accident and more recently with the Armenian earthquake. Unrest exists in Soviet satellite states and among ethnic minorities. Soviet military grouses over defense cuts with discontent probably growing. And Soviet bureaucracy which accounts for 15 percent of the work force resists change because they may lose power and perks. Moreover there is no guarantee against someone or some group replacing Gorbachev and his policies. Even Russians are uneasy about the future.

During my trip to the U.S.S.R. last June, I visited a Russian Orthodox church and a synagogue in Irkutsk, a Siberian city of about 2 million inhabitants. The church had regular services but only a few ancient women came. The synagogue's caretaker said that the rabbi was 92 and without a replacement, the congregation's youngest member was 62 and everyone worried how future Soviet leadership would view religious activities despite the fact that current leaders appeared to tolerate them. It's interesting that the Intourist guide (Intourist is part of the Soviet KGB) refused to set foot in the religious buildings.

In short, Gorbachev *Inside* has real troubles. He's raised hopes for a better life, but *perestroika* has failed so far to produce results despite his best intentions and forceful commitment to change. It will be many years, perhaps a decade, before concrete results appear and they may depend on what we do in the West to respond to Gorbachev's initiatives.

### Gorbachev Outside

Gorbachev *Outside* is a smashing success. He ranks with the best in public relations spectacles, sense of timing and upmanship. He tells the West what it wants to hear. He assures leaders that the U.S.S.R. no longer should be viewed as a dangerous adversary and that they should lend him the billions needed to finance his goal of building an economic superpower. In fact, he says, Soviet military doctrine and forces are becoming "purely defensive." It's unclear what this means because most military weapons such as aircraft, tanks, antitank systems and artillery have offensive as well as defensive capabilities and armed forces would be foolish not to be trained both ways. His unilateral troop cut announced at the United Nations, guaranteed headlines. It warmed the faint hearts of those yearning to read into every Soviet initiative an opportunity for avoiding the difficult choices in maintaining Western defenses as the basis for security and negotiating from strength. He's already announced willingness to make the Krasnoyarsk radar an international space lab thereby undermining U.S. view of the radar as a violation of the ABM treaty.

Moreover, this year we should see a Sino-Soviet summit that eases the tension between these giants and fosters more trade which now exceeds \$10 billion a year.



Both nations want tranquility to cope with monumental economic problems. As I reported in the October *Signal*, military tension along the 4,500 mile border has given way to substantial trade and friendly contact.

Consequently, if Gorbachev persists with his initiatives and upmanship, the West will lose the U.S.S.R. as a "whipping boy" for justifying to voters defense buildups as well as continuance of "containment" type foreign policies.

### **Gorbachev's Troop Reduction**

The announced reductions over the next several years of 500,000 in army strength, including 10,000 tanks and six divisions from Eastern Europe are both welcome and potentially significant. In a sense this initiative signifies success for NATO's policy of building strength from which to negotiate equitable reductions just as occurred with the INF Treaty.

The announcement could be significant because withdrawals from Eastern Europe might double warning time of an attack. In theory the U.S.S.R. would have to mobilize and redeploy withdrawn forces thereby giving NATO several weeks to mobilize reserves, deploy malpositioned forces to forward positions, emplace obstacles including minefields, and fly reinforcing units from the United States. But for warning time to be real, NATO would have to verify withdrawals and possess means such as overflight rights or on-site inspectors to detect changes.

The reductions also are welcome because, if verified, they would begin redressing asymmetries between the alliances. NATO intends to respond with a plan limiting main battle weapons in Europe, including weapons stationed in the "heavy traffic zone" of Central Europe. For example, this plan requires reducing the total number of Pact and NATO tanks from 68,000 to a ceiling of 40,000 for both Alliances and 20 percent of this level or 8,000 tanks would have to be positioned outside the "central front or zone." Similar ceilings would apply to other weapon systems. The NATO proposal also posits measures for increasing stability and early warning through notification of changes in strength of units and troop movements. Dr. Kissinger suggests a similar scheme of four zones: west of the Rhine; from the Rhine to the Elbe; from the Elbe to the Polish-Soviet border; and from this border to beyond Moscow. Force levels in the two inside zones would be equal, as would forces in the two inner zones.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the plan, it would be foolhardy for NATO to make unilateral force reductions. Rather, we should negotiate equitable reductions from the only position that the Soviets respect—one of strength. Even with the announced reductions, the Warsaw Pact would retain superiority over NATO forces in virtually every category.

### **The West's Challenge**

We can welcome Gorbachev's initiatives and perhaps should wish him well because his efforts may better his peoples' lives and lead to a less confrontational international order. However, we need to proceed cautiously. The West already provides billions in financial credits. But shouldn't we demand from the U.S.S.R. confidence building actions such as human rights improvements, a currency that floats internationally in value, and a lower level of defense spending which experts estimate currently approaches 25 percent of Soviet GDP in sharp contrast with NATO's average of 3.3 percent and the U.S. of 6.5 percent? Credits without strings attached will enable Soviet leaders to avoid the hard choices between "guns and butter." The

U.S.S.R. continues to produce three times more tanks than NATO. We should insist that if they want our help in financing economic growth, then military efforts should be scaled back substantially and in verifiable ways. A major survey of American public opinion supports this view. The survey concludes that "by almost four-to-one Americans would rather help than hurt the Soviet economy in the interests of promoting greater freedom and democracy. But...Americans are feeling hope and wariness in equal measure. It is too soon, much too soon, to make decisions or start acting on the assumption that the Soviets mean what they now say."<sup>3</sup>

Thus the real challenge for the West will be to maintain its perspective for the next decade or so and insist on concrete actions instead of accepting at face value verbal blandishments of Soviet leaders. We must avoid paranoia about the U.S.S.R. as well as overreaction to every gesture from Gorbachev. If he succeeds with his reforms and the U.S.S.R. grows into an economic superpower, then we must have solid assurance that Gorbachev *Outside* means us well, that U.S.S.R. foreign policy has changed irrevocably for the better, and that historic Russian goals have been forgotten, not just set aside temporarily. This may be asking the Bear to change his fur's color, hence the need for caution. As a consequence NATO and particularly the United States, despite temptations to celebrate the Cold War's end, must keep up its defenses, continue to modernize them and maintain the technology lead by investing wisely in C4I capabilities. Strength assures us the best position to negotiate equitably conventional, chemical and strategic weapons reductions. Strength allows us the freedom for clear-headed thought about what we want from a potentially less threatening U.S.S.R. and what we consequently would be willing to compromise in the way of foreign policy and defense.

The *London Economist* makes a similar point. "Note the contradiction between Mr. Gorbachev's message to the West (trust me, because my reforms are irreversible) and the warnings he increasingly gives at home (battle on comrades, or our reforms could fail). Those reforms still depend to an alarming degree on one man. Alternative leaders are ready, alternative policies can be found: a robust reimposition of central authority would fit all too neatly into the Russian tradition. Admirers of Gorbachev would be wise to remember the lesson of Gorbachev *East: perestroika* is not yet irreversible."<sup>4</sup>

#### References

1. *The London Economist*, December 10, 1988, p. 17.
2. *The Washington Post*, December 4, 1988, p. 1.
3. *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1988, p. 17.
4. *Economist*, p. 10.

Editor's Note: Colonel John A. Pattison is the Deputy Commandant for the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, bringing General Wickham's message to this journal.



# Language Notes

## Defense Language Proficiency Test III Familiarization Guide

by Sergeant First Class Bill Salndon

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) has published a Defense Language Proficiency Test III (DLPT III) Familiarization Guide. Since the DLPT III test format is somewhat unusual to the person who has never taken the test, it is recommended that all linguists and their trainers read the Guide. It contains test formats and practical exercises for all modalities (listening, reading and speaking).

The guide also contains Inter-agency Language Roundtable Language Skill Level descriptions. If, for example, a German linguist scores a 2+-2+ on the DLPT III, he and his commander probably know that the linguist is entitled to \$75.00 per month for foreign language proficiency pay. But, do they have a formal understanding of what his language capabilities are? By reading the skill level descriptions, both the linguist and the commander will have a better knowledge of the linguist's capabilities. As an example, if a linguist scores a 1-1 on the DLPT III, he would be expected "to understand only utterances about basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements." He would also be expected to be able "to read very simple connected written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript." If a linguist scores a 2+-2+, he would be able "to understand most routine social demands and most conversations on work requirements as well as some discus-

sions on concrete topics related to particular interests and special fields of competence." He would also have "sufficient comprehension to understand most factual material in non-technical prose as well as some discussions on concrete topics related to special professional interests."

Additional, valuable information contained in the DLPT III Familiarization Guide includes a description of the DLPT III "lower range" and "upper range." All examinees are initially administered the lower range form of the DLPT III. The lower range form will test a person's ability only up to level 3. If an examinee scores a level 3 on the lower range test, he will be permitted to take the upper range test for that skill to determine whether his proficiency is actually 3+ or higher.

Language categories based on relative learning difficulty for American-English speakers is also listed. For example, French is a Category 1 language, German is a Category 2 language, while Russian is a Category 3 language, and Arabic is a Category 4 language. Category 1 is the least difficult category, while category 4 is the most difficult category.

Finally, the Guide also contains an explanation of the validation process of the DLPT III. In 1982 a massive new development program of the DLPT was launched. The result was the DLPT III, which is considered to be truly comprehensive. As each DLPT III is implemented, its DLPT I and/or II counterpart is removed from the test system.

Again, it is highly recommended that each unit have at least one copy of the DLPT III Familiarization Guide, so that each linguist and each commander can become more knowledgeable of the language evaluation instrument as

well as obtaining a better understanding of each linguist's capabilities. Unit Training NCOs are encouraged to write: Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, ATTN: ATFL-EST, Presidio of Monterey, CA 93944-5006 and request one or more copies of *DLIFLC Pamphlet 350-12*, dated April 1, 1988.

## The Cryptologic Training and Evaluation Program

by Sergeant First Class Bill Salndon

The lack of job-specific language training material has been a problem within the Military Intelligence community for a long time. Compounding the problem is the requirement to take the Defense Language Proficiency Test III annually. The Navy Security Group Command, however, has had a job-specific language training and evaluation tool since 1972. The Cryptologic Training and Evaluation Program (CTEP) consists of a yearly cycle, in which the linguist completes training packages, called Scenario Training Units (STUNS), in preparation for an annual test. STUNS use self-paced training tools comprised of written and aural materials showing one specific tactical event.

The main features of CTEP include:

1. Development and administration of an annual cryptolinguistic diagnostic test (mandatory for all enlisted linguists E-1 through E-7).
2. Formal feedback to commands and personnel showing strengths and weaknesses of job-specific language abilities.

continued on page 44

# Training Notes





**by Chief Warrant Officer Three  
Raymond R. Mead**

Since World War II, deception had become almost a lost art. It was always rediscovered during major conflicts but allowed to lapse into obscurity in peacetime. However, during the past several years there has been a renewed interest.

With the renewed interest in deception, the Intelligence Center and School became the proponent for Battlefield Deception (Bat-D) training in January 1986. The first class of the Bat-D Assignment Specific Module began in August of 1987 and graduated in December of that same year. To date, eight classes have graduated from the Bat-D course.

Bat-D students are trained to perform duties in either a Corps or Division Bat-D element. At Corps, the Bat-D element is assigned to the MI Brigade (CEWI) but works for the Corps G3.

The Bat-D course is an assignment specific module. Students attending this course must be assigned to a Bat-D Element or on orders to a Bat-D assignment. Funding is provided by the gaining

command if TDY en route or by assigned unit if TDY and return.

The class size is limited to a maximum of 31 personnel, one Corps team and one Division team. Classes are normally filled as units activate their Bat-D Element. The course is presently limited to active Army soldiers.

Bat-D students receive classroom instruction on friendly and enemy organization and tactics, friendly and enemy communications and command and control, hostile threat, and briefing techniques. Hands-on training includes deception planning, preparation of deception estimates and annexes, and how to set up and maintain sophisticated multispectral decoys.

The highlight of the course is the five day FTX that gives students the opportunity to enact their own deception plan. On the first day they prepare their deception plan. On the second day they establish a brigade command post using related deception equipment. On the third day the students prepare the deception plan of a logistical base which is established on the fourth day. The logistical base

uses a three dimensional two and a half ton truck and a three dimensional OH-58 helicopter. The latter (shown in the photos) is a favorite with students and observers alike.

During the FTX phase, coordination is made with the 1st School Battalion's Aviation Training Support Company for aerial reconnaissance coverage of the FTX sites with the OV-1D Mohawk aircraft. The photos are used to show the students how well or how poorly they executed their deception. During the February class, TRADOC Systems Manager-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Office provided real-time video coverage of an FTX site that was extremely well received by the class.

Feedback from former students in the field helps to keep the course current and realistic. The Bat-D cadre continue to strive to make deception a "low buck" combat multiplier for the tactical commander and to keep him always out front!

For information on Bat-D training contact Chief Warrant Officer Three Raymond R. Mead at autovon 821-2801/2360 or commercial 602-533-2801/2360.



# Leadership Notes

## Who Cares About the Soldier's Family?

by Captain Mike Ragoza

Who cares about the soldier's family? You should! As a commander or leader, welfare of the troops extends to their families. The cornerstone to effective soldier care is developing a responsive family support program. Last August, I led my brigade's headquarters company on a 70-day Reforger deployment. The length of the deployment and the distance involved made family support a primary concern. This article is based on that experience and will, I hope, provide guidance for creating a proactive family support program.

The first step in this process is an analysis of your existing program, if one exists. Evaluate the program against upcoming deployment and personnel turnover. Ensure you have a stable chain of concern that mirrors the chain of command. The chain of concern should consist of key NCO and officer spouses. The chain must be voluntary, as care and compassion can not be coerced. It should also be professional. The members must know the military and civilian support agencies that are available for help. In the 2d Armored Division, the division G1 conducted monthly support seminars that examined all of the aspects of family support.

Once you establish a support group, it's up to the chain of command to make it work. The commander and first sergeant should promote the availability of the group to all soldiers. They should stress the existence of the support chain, the agencies available to help and try to identify any problems the soldiers may have. Early identification of marital or

financial difficulties helps speed up the problem-solving process and prevents escalation of the problem. The soldier should feel that the commander and his unit care for him and his family.

You should plan a support brief a few weeks prior to a deployment date. Invite the soldiers and their families, and arrange babysitting assistance. Hold the brief in a cordial, comfortable setting, not in some old, drafty classroom. At Fort Hood, we held ours at the officers club and had refreshments available. Make sure representatives of the various support agencies are on hand to provide their information.

***"Early identification of marital or financial difficulties helps speed up the problem-solving process and prevents escalation of the problem."***

The briefing should begin with the commander explaining the importance of the deployment and the who, why and when (who is going, why are they going, when are they going and when are they returning). Introduce the rear detachment commander and the key members of the chain of concern. Then turn the brief over to the agency representative, so they can brief in their own words what they can and cannot do to support the soldier and his family. When the brief has ended, pass out a deployment booklet with the names and phone numbers of people who can help.

Even though the actual deployment exercise will be hectic and demanding, don't forget to check in

with the rear detachment. Monitor problems, assist where possible and provide guidance and support to the chain of concern. Ensure soldiers call or write home and keep everybody informed of both exercise and "back at home" happenings.

The chain of concern should be calling and checking on all families. You mustn't forget those families without phones or those who had them disconnected during the exercise. Then, there are the families who may have moved to live with relatives. This last group may be miles from a military facility and not know what to do in an emergency. The support group should also plan social activities to help relieve the boredom and loneliness of those left at home.

Finally, don't forget to support the supporters. Many members of the chain of concern may have their own problems along with helping others to solve theirs. Words and letters of encouragement can provide the necessary motivation to keep these dynamic people going.

When you return from the exercise, arrange a small welcoming party with the families. Make sure everybody knows where and when the soldiers will return. Don't delay in releasing the soldiers. Account for property and dismiss them to their loved ones. Provide a few days of immediate time off to continue the reunion process.

The exercise may be over but your work is not. Provide follow up on any of the soldiers' problems and ensure effective resolution. Analyze your deployment in terms of what worked and what didn't in the family support area. Thank everybody who helped and don't forget those families that provided assistance. Finally, check your calendar and begin planning for that next deployment.

## Motor Officer — "To BMO or Not To BMO"

by First Lieutenant Randy A. Weaver

So, you don't want to be a motor officer? Well, ladies and gentlemen, someone has to. It is, at the very least, a demanding job. If you do your job well, you'll put in a lot of hours. You'll take regular buttchewings. And, you won't have many opportunities to exercise your skills as an intelligence officer. The good side is (yes, there is a good side), should you aspire to command, there is no better preparation! You'll experience "leadership challenges" rarely encountered by MI officers and, if you do your job well, you'll become intimately familiar with supply and maintenance procedures.

Let's face it, few of us, if any, have an overwhelming desire to become a motor officer. It is not, after all, an MOS-prestigious position. A proper frame of mind is your most important asset when assuming your duties. If you approach your job with a positive, determined attitude, if you have a conviction that all of your expensive equipment is useless if the prime movers and generators don't run, you're well on your way to success.

The old adage that it's better to inherit a poor unit than a good one doesn't necessarily apply here. Every maintenance operation has room for improvement. You must be convinced of the necessity for an effective maintenance program. And, you won't find a higher profile job — especially if your commander places the proper emphasis on maintenance.

Like every soldier in the Army, mechanics and support personnel take extreme pride in a job well done. Just as a 98G takes pride in

a 3-3 language proficiency score, a 63B takes pride in a vehicle for which he is responsible coming through an IG inspection with no deficiencies. Recognize the contributions mechanics and support personnel make to a unit's combat readiness and be prepared to take advantage of their sense of pride.

This is a prime opportunity to develop a leadership style. The "leadership challenges" will try your patience and cause you more than one sleepless night. Somewhere, some famous general probably said, "you have to lead from the front." Find out what a 63B, 63Y, 52C or a 77F are. Nothing will damage your credibility more than asking one of your 63Bs what he or she does. We all make some preparation for upcoming assignments. An assignment as a motor officer is no different. Take time to learn before you get there.

Be visible and let your soldiers know that you recognize and appreciate their hard work. Don't be afraid to get your hands dirty. If you don't know how to pack a wheel bearing, now's a good time to learn. Shake the hand of a greasy soldier who has busted his tail getting a vehicle ready for movement and let him know that you're proud of him. It'll take you further than a whole bushel of AAMs. And, when the time comes to hand out those awards, don't forget your mechanics.

The DA Form 2406 is a motor officer's best friend or greatest enemy. Achieve the goal of a 90 percent Operational Readiness Rate (ORR), and you'll be proud to hand it to your commander. Hit 75 percent, and you'll want to send it

through distribution via Greenland. Most importantly, be certain that the 2406 reflects the truth. Beyond integrity, it gives your commander a picture of the combat readiness/deployability of his unit. Nothing can get your boss into deeper kimchi than reporting a 90 percent ORR, having the unit roll-out and only 50 percent of the vehicles even start. Remember, it rolls downhill.\*

The Prescribed Load List (PLL) is the bane of tactical commanders and, consequently, motor officers. You never have enough. Your job is to keep track of the status of your PLL. Keep your commander informed, and ensure that your PLL can support your mission. A good PLL clerk is worth his weight in PLL. (Get a big PLL clerk.)

In the final analysis, mechanics just aren't as "good" as MI soldiers, right? Wrong again! Neither soldier does very well without the other, especially in an MI unit. Mechanics don't make particularly good 98Gs. But how many 98Gs know how to pull a pack on a 577? Insist that operators assist mechanics when their vehicles are in the shop. (They're supposed to, you know). Educate your mechanics on the mission of the MI soldier and the conditions under which they're often required to operate. Resentment and ill feelings have been responsible for the failure of more than one maintenance program.

You still don't want to be a motor officer? Don't blame you. Just remember, no job is ever as easy or as difficult as it first may seem. So, get a pair of coveralls and go forth and maintain.

\* Editor's note — Perhaps Lieutenant Weaver means vehicles roll down hill?

***"A good PLL clerk is worth his weight in PLL. (Get a big PLL clerk.)"***



# Reserve Notes

## Toward One Army

by Captain George Ruff

It's no secret that our Reserve Component (RC and National Guard) plays a growing role in the Army's mission. In the past few years it's made great strides and the trend must continue.

Major planners and commands have much work ahead. They must look at budget and personnel issues and modernization of reserve equipment must continue. Some major training courses will have to be redesigned to meet RC needs and to work within its constraints.

It's easy for those of us in the active component to say, "How does that affect me? I don't work with the reserves." That may be true, but more of us have connections with the RC than we realize. Many of us belong to divisions that have two active brigades and one RC (round out) brigade. Some of us serve in TDA units with Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) or members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). If we become involved in a major conflict, we'll all quickly learn about our ties with the reserves.

Contrary to some commonly held beliefs, the RC is not a bunch of weekend warriors playing soldier for the fun of it. The overwhelming majority are dedicated professional soldiers in units that have a genuine desire to help in America's defense. But, they have obstacles to readiness that few of us in the Active Component really have a feel for.

To get an idea of those obstacles, try this. Take your long range planning calendar and select a few key events. For starters, take a two-week FTX, SQT training, common task training, weapons qualifi-

cations, maintenance, NCO professional development and officer professional development — just the standard stuff. Of course, you've still got your administration (personnel actions, finance problems) and other daily tasks. If that's not enough, throw in an inspection.

An RC yearly training calendar has only about 40 days on it, and all the days are not together. Some months you only have two days. In the summer you get about 15 in a row. Also, when doing your planning, don't forget that your battalion is dispersed over a 150 mile radius. On the average, it's nine miles to the motor pool, 40 miles to the local training area, 65 miles to the rifle range and 154 miles to a major training area. Oh yes, I forgot to tell you, you have a 50 percent turnover rate of E5s and below. There is also a one-in-twenty chance that while you're training, your unit will undergo a major conversion.

Remember, your goal is to always be combat ready!

That is a fairly accurate picture of the RC mission. If you happen to come up with an easy answer, please forward it to the Chief of the Army Reserve or the Director of the Army National Guard. They have a Legion of Merit waiting for you.

Maybe we can't solve these problems overnight, but let's get started and help. All of us will have some good soldiers (officers and enlisted) who for one reason or another will decide to leave active duty. Let's make sure they think about continued service in the RC. Chances are good there's a reserve unit near where they're going. If not, don't forget the IRR. If you need information about units, the Army Reserve Personnel Center or the Guard Bureau can help.

Don't worry if you'll make the Old Man mad if you find yourself heading to the field for two weeks of RC evaluations. Take the challenge. That's what the RCs do. They don't want to be cut slack. Their standards are the same as yours. On the battlefield, backgrounds become insignificant pretty fast, only ability counts. Understand the RC's constraints, but hold onto standards. Teach and learn with them.

If you are in a TDA unit, find out if you're authorized (or should be authorized) IMAs. If those slots are vacant, work with the Army Personnel Center to do some recruiting. When you have IMAs, make sure they feel they're a real part of the unit, not part-time help for two weeks of the year. Don't use their arrival as a good chance to get your SOPs or contingency plans reviewed. Keep the IMAs up-to-date with what's going on in the unit, they have to be ready if you mobilize. You may even want to see if they're available for a few weeks the next time you find yourself at 40 percent strength with the biggest exercise of the year or the IG coming.

Are you looking for someone to give an officer or NCO professional development class? Ask someone from a local reserve unit, he's likely to be more than willing to come and talk about his unit or reserve duty. Don't be surprised if he's sharp and experienced. He has some good civilian skills in addition to his military knowledge.

Keep the RC informed when there is to be a good briefing given on post. A couple of extra people in the theater or conference room won't matter. Maybe they'd like to see your TOC the next time it's set up in the field. Would a couple more visitors distract from training? Probably not.



Go one step further. You know that dining out you're having next month? The one the S1 still has lots of tickets for. Invite your RC friends. Many good feelings and deals for mutual cooperation can begin over dinner and drinks at the club.

So there you have it — some simple ways to get to know the other part of the Army. These ways won't solve any major readiness problems, but it's a few steps in the right direction. If you think your boss might not go for such a

simple way to improve interaction with the RC, tell him it's a, "Proposal for an integrated exchange of technical, tactical and cultural information by those elements required to respond in the event of degeneration of diplomacy and commencement of hostilities by those desirous of cessation of the democratic way of life. This exchange will facilitate an appropriate and swift response by our vanguards and ensure the rapid termination of such forces as would seek to impose their views

and domination on the free societies of the world." \*

Whatever you need to do, do it and get to know the Reserve Component.

#### Sources

Statistics were quoted from "Mission is the Same, Challenges Different" by Colonel Benjamin W. Covington, III, *Army Magazine*, July 1988.

\* **Editor's Note:** This paragraph of "Greenspeak" has been printed only for your reading pleasure. Do NOT talk to any living soldier in "greenspeak."

## Officer Notes

### Officer Training Update

by Lieutenant Colonel William L. Jackson

In the latter part of 1983 USAICS implemented a bold, new training strategy for MI officers. Previously, lieutenants entering MI attended the Officer Basic Course (OBC) and graduated with SIGINT, CI, etc. specialties. However, largely due to the activation of divisional MI battalions 75 percent of these lieutenants were assigned at the tactical level. This resulted in a change in philosophy, and a new OBC, the longest in TRADOC at just under 24 weeks, was developed to train all lieutenants as tactical intelligence officers. (OPMS II has further validated 35D as the base line Area of Concentration for all MI officers.) The MI Officer Advanced Course (OAC) became the sole source of other specialties and advanced tactical intelligence.

Today the OAC includes nine weeks of Common Core (MI and Army), 10 weeks of a track (35C, 35D, 35E and 35G), and ends with the G2 Workstation, an automated division-level exercise. The eventual elimination of the 35D track

was seen as part of the original strategy. The rationale was that since all MI officers entering the Advanced Course were already trained as tactical intelligence officers, and since most would have served in that capacity, we didn't need to expend valuable resources conducting a separate track at the OAC level. However, we fully recognized the need to provide "advanced" tactical intelligence training. In November 1987 a USAICS Council of Colonels validated this plan. The Council further directed a detailed review of all tracks. Their consensus was that we needed to provide more technical training in order to graduate more competent 35Cs, 35Es and 35Gs. A lengthy series of action officer reviews ended in October 1988 with a decision brief to Major General Julius Parker, Jr., Commandant, USAICS. His decision resulted in a phased restructure of the MIOAC.

This spring/summer the OAC Common Core will be modified, without increased length, to include the critical elements of the soon to be discontinued 35D track. The modifications will include more and new instruction on such things as the Soviet troop control process. Those few officers returning to the OAC who do not already

possess the 35D AOC will probably attend the MI Officer Transition Course, designed for Force Alignment Plan III and Branch Detail Officers. They will then attend just the OAC Common Core; details are still being worked out. As of April 1989, aviators entering MIOAC will also attend the transition course. Additionally, in FY90, the Common Core will be reduced to six to seven weeks, the tracks increased to 11 to 12 weeks, with no change in the G2 Workstation. Officers must possess a security clearance based on a Special Background Investigation with access to sensitive information prior to their arrival at Fort Huachuca.

The current OAC contains little or no "fluff." We anticipate that the proposed restructure will make the course even more challenging. I should point out that final implementation was timed to coincide with development of new Critical Task Lists for MIOACs. The surveys many of you recently completed and returned to the Soldier Support Center will provide the necessary data base to complete the ongoing MI officer front end analysis.

One new approach has been adopted at the field grade level. There is no resident course at Fort

Huachuca designed solely for division G2s. Major General Parker recognized this shortfall and directed that we make the first week of the Pre-Command Course available to G2 designees. The

Chief, MI Branch is advising gaining units of training availability and funding requirements. We will tailor training to individual requirements as much as possible.

For more information contact

USAICS, Individual Training Division, autovon 821-2452/2040. □

### Cryptologic Program

(continued from page 37.)

3. Development of individual remedial training programs based on test results.


4. Revised and reviewed STUNS are produced and distributed to the field to support command training programs.

The Navy believes that CTEP is a dynamic program that reflects evolving operational tactics, since the STUNS and test consist of authentic materials. The program also successfully supports language maintenance and enhances linguistic proficiency. The Navy is

willing to provide technical assistance in the development of a similar program for the Army. Navy personnel briefed subject matter experts on CTEP at the Intelligence Center and School in August 1988 and at the Intelligence School, Fort Devens in November 1988. USAICS has tasked USAISD to initiate evaluation of the program and to compare it with existing cryptologic training programs (i.e., 98G Skill Qualification Tests and the Voice Interceptor Comprehensive Evaluation). Additionally, USAICS is preparing a Memorandum of Agreement with Forces Command

(FORSCOM) to initiate a pilot program, which would involve two FORSCOM units to complete a six-month cycle of CTEP. Upon completion of the evaluations, results and recommendations will be sent to TRADOC for a final analysis and approval for implementation into the Army language training system.

For more information on both of these articles contact Sergeant First Class Bill Saindon, autovon 821-3012, Foreign Language Office, USAICS, Fort Huachuca, AZ.



This is an artist's concept of the proposed Intelligence Corps Museum to be built at Fort Huachuca. Help make the dream a reality. Write to the Intelligence Museum Foundation at P.O. Box 595, Sierra Vista, Ariz. 85635.

MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION Executive Director Intelligence Museum Foundation Post Office Box 595 Sierra Vista, AZ 85636	Name:	Last First MI			Grade:	(optional)	
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# PROFESSIONAL READER

## A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR:

I'm new here. Each day I find a little something new and surprising. This week's surprise was a file drawer full of unedited, unpublished book reviews that had been squirreled away for a rainy day by editors before me. I can't publish them all, but I want to recognize the time and effort of the reviewers.

If you would like a copy of any of these unprinted manuscripts, please send a stamped, self-addressed envelope with your request.

Again, thanks for your professional interest and efforts, reviewers. I will make it a point in the future to publish reviews in a more timely fashion.

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**America's First Battles: 1776-1965** edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, (University of Kansas, 1986, 352 pages) **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Sanders Jr.**

**The Middle East Military Balance 1986** edited by A. Levran, (The Jerusalem Post and Westview Press, 1987, 462 pages) **Reviewed by Major Robert B. Adolph Jr.**

**Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism, the Continuing Debate** edited by Tawfic E. Farah, (Westview Press, 1987, 208 pages) **Reviewed by Major Robert B. Adolph Jr.**

**The Australian Guerilla: Sniping** by Ion L. Idress, (Paladin Press, 1989, 100 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Rick Ugino**

**Spy vs Spy: Stalking Soviet Spies in America**, by Ronald Kessler, (New York: Scribner & Sons, 308 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Rick Ugino**

**The Secret War with Germany** by William B. Bræuer, (Presidio Press, 1988, 318 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Rick Ugino**

**Foreign Intelligence Organizations** by Jeffrey T. Richelson, (Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988, 350 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Rick Ugino**

**Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era** by Steven Emerson, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1988, 256 pages) **Reviewed by Captain William H. Burgess III**

**The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Defence** by William A. Dorman and Mansour Farhang, (University of California Press, 1987, 272 pages) **Reviewed by Captain William H. Burgess III**

**Secrecy and Power - The Life of J. Edgar Hoover** by Richard G. Powers, (New York: The Free Press, 1987, 624 pages) **Reviewed by Captain William H. Burgess III**

**Sacred Rage** by Robin Wright, (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1985, 313 pages) **Reviewed by Captain William H. Burgess III**

**Sword Point** by Harold Coyle, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988) **Reviewed by Michael S. Evancevich**

**August 1944 — The Campaign for France** by Robert A. Miller, (Presidio Press, 1988, 280 pages) **Reviewed by Michael S. Evancevich**

**"C" The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Menzies** by Anthony Cave Brown, (MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987, 830 pages) **Reviewed by Michael S. Evancevich**

**International Security Dimensions of Space** edited by Uri Ra'anana & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., (The Shoe String Press, 1984, 324 pages) **Reviewed by Michael S. Evancevich**

**Gettysburg: The Second Day** by Harry W. Pfanz, (University of North Carolina Press, 1987, 601 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Eric K. Naeseth**

**Great Commanders and Their Battles** by Anthony Livesey, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987, 200 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Eric K. Naeseth**

**Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him** by Merle Miller, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1987, 859 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Eric K. Naeseth**

**The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower** by Elmo Richardson, (University Press of Kansas, 1985, 218 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Eric K. Naeseth**

**The Final Argument of Kings** by Major General (Ret.) E. B. Atkeson, (Hero Books, 1988, 260 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Eric K. Naeseth**

**Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival** by Grant M. Farr and John C. Merriam, (Westview Press, 1987, 235 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Robert E. Kells, Jr.**

**Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America** by Abraham R. Lowenthal, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, 240 pages) **Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Ramsey**

**Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America** by Barry Ames, (University of California Press, 1987, 286 pages) **Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Ramsey**

**We Band of Brothers** by R.E. Peppy Blount, (Austin TX: Eakin Press, 1984, 393 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Bill Nikides**

**Under the Bombs** by Earl Beck, (University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 252 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Bill Nikides**

**The Rise of American Air Power** by Michael S. Sherry, (Yale University Press, 1987, 435 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Bill Nikides**

**We Shall Return: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan** edited by William M. Leary, (University Press of Kentucky, 1988, 305 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Bill Nikides**

**Once They Were Eagles: Black Sheep Squadron** by Frank E. Walton, (University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 213 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Bill Nikides**

**The Liberation of One** by Romuald Spasowski, (New York: HBJ, 1987, 704 pages) **Reviewed by John Dembowski, Jr.**

**From Crisis to Crisis: Soviet-Polish Relations in the 1970s** by Viadimir Wozniuk, (Iowa State University Press, 1987, 176 pages) **Reviewed by John Dembowski, Jr.**

**Generals in International Politics, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe** edited by Robert S. Jordan, (University Press of Kentucky, 1987, 229 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Ralph Peters**

**Rebel Raider** by James A. Ramage, (University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 306 pages) **Reviewed by Charles G. Hutchinson**

**The Bombers** by Robin Cross, (MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987, 224 pages) **Reviewed by Chuck Dahl**

**The Emerging Role of the U.S. Army in Space** by Arthur J. Downey, (GPO, 1985, 92 pages) **Reviewed by Jan Goldman**

**A Missing Plane** by Susan Sheehan, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1986, 201 pages) **Reviewed by Jan Goldman**

**Air Battle - Central Europe** by Alfred Price, (MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987, 192 pages) **Reviewed by Colonel Leonard Nowak**

**Guardians, Strategic Reconnaissance Satellites** by Curtis Peebles, (Presidio Press, 1987, 418 pages) **Reviewed by William S. Wojsko**

**Sherman's March and Vietnam** by James Reston, (MacMillan Publishing Co., 1984, 323 pages) **Reviewed by William S. Wojsko**

**The Leadership Factor** by John P. Kotter, (The Free Press, 1988, 161 pages) **Reviewed by William S. Wojsko**

**Team Yankee** by Harold Coyle, (Presidio Press, 1987, 313 page) **Reviewed by William S. Wojsko**

**Soviet Military Power**, (GPO, 1988, 175 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Lance Eldridge**

**International Policy Formation in the USSR** by Gavriel Ra'anani, (The Shoe String Press, 1983, 248 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Lance Eldridge**

**Securing Europe's Future** edited by Stewart J. Flanagan & Fen O. Hampson, (Auburn House Publishing Co., 1986, 334 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Lance Eldridge**

**Reforming Defense: The State of American Civil-Military Relations** by David C. Hendrickson, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, 124 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Lance Eldridge**

**From Brezhnev to Gorbachev** by Baruch A. Hazan, (Westview Press, 1987, 260 pages) **Reviewed by Major Stephen P. Hallick, Jr.**

**The Soviet Union in Transition** edited by Kinya Niiseki, (Westview Press, 1987, 243 pages) **Reviewed by Major James G. Borowski**

**The God that Failed** edited by Richard H. Crossman, (Regnery Gateway, 1987, 273 pages) **Reviewed by First Lieutenant Bryan S. Boyce**



**Atlas of the Soviet Union** by The Bureau of Public Affairs, (GPO, 1987, 21 pages) **Reviewed by Peter Charles Unsinger**

**The Incredible Year** by Donald J. Willis, (Iowa State University Press, 1988, 159 pages) **Reviewed by Peter Charles Unsinger**

**A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence** by Walter Laqueur, (Basic Books, Inc., 1985, 404 pages) **Reviewed by Peter Charles Unsinger**

**NAZI Rule and Dutch Collaboration** by Gerhard Hirschfeld, (St. Martin's Press, 1988, 351 pages) **Reviewed by Peter Charles Unsinger**

**A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam** by Neil Sheehan, (Random House, 1988, 861 pages) **Reviewed by Fred Joyce**

**Inside the Aquarium**, **Reviewed by Captain Thomas Talbot**

**Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-1987**, (U.S. State Department, GPO, 1987, 89 pages) **Reviewed by First Lieutenant John R. Mills**

**A Day of Battle: Mars-La-Tour, 16 August 1870** by David Ascoli, (London: Harrap, Ltd., 1987) **Reviewed by Arthur Coumbe**

**Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of Defense**, (GPO, 1985, 114 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Tommy Davis**

**The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America's Secret War in Laos** by Christopher Robbins, (Crown Publishers, 1987,) **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel William Howard**

**The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security** edited by Richard H. Solomon & Masataka Kosaka, (Auburn House Publishing Co., 1986, 301 pages) **Reviewed by Captain Len Kosakowski**

**ENTER THE DRAGON: China's Undeclared War Against The U.S. In Korea, 1950-1951** by Russell Spurr, (New York: Newmarket Press, 1988) **Reviewed by Captain Karl F. Wolfgang**

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**Traitors** by Chapman Pincher, New York: Penguin Books, 1987, 346 pages, \$7.86 papercover.

If you want a complete review of the areas of human intelligence (HUMINT) for the last 70 years of the "Cold War" (beginning in 1918 with the desire to export revolution and preserve/enhance the Soviet Union), then you'll want to read **Traitors**. Chapman Pincher, a British reporter and long time viewer of the espionage scene, looks at the what, who, when, where and how of the whole issue, with an emphasis on the years following 1938.

Pincher has interviewed many of the participants on both sides of the Atlantic and researched in depth biographical and historical material to ask some key questions. Since those who were involved are often people who had access to the secrets of state or

who could influence events immediately and in the future, they were labeled by their country as traitors. Traitor is a term that evokes considerable emotion. Still, it is difficult to label as traitor persons who act from convictions, despite the fact that many simply rationalized their personality deficiency with the mantle of some higher philosophy. The present day "turning" of Westerners with money has simplified much in explaining behaviors, even though these traitors blame shortcomings in their homeland rather than admit their own shortcomings. It is this behavior that draws Pincher's attention.

The book is well written. It easily keeps a reader's attention. It provides examples of the personalities of the "traitors", how they were recruited (a must for anyone who will be placed in sensitive situations), how they were spotted and other questions that come to mind when doing an in-depth study into

the whole espionage question. Interviews, studies and biographies are used to illustrate the points Pincher wants to make.

There is one vexing question that appears in Pincher's writing. It's the issue of whether Roger Hollis of MI5, British security, was a Soviet agent. Pincher refers to the question incessantly, which was disturbing as the issue obviously still remains unresolved.

The last chapter of the book contains the author's arguments about obtaining a balance in the matter of the rights of the individual vs. the rights of the nation and its people in the war that is waged in the twilight area. There is no doubt the thrust of legal thinking has clouded the attempts to thwart Soviet espionage and placed the West at a disadvantage. The author, while pointing out the problem, does not offer any solutions that would guarantee protection to both the nation and the individual.

This shouldn't detract from an excellent review of a multitude of stories placed into a coherent whole and re-told well. It does say that the democracies had better look over these rights that have been evolving through interpretation and question whether they, in fact, should have some balanced regard for the individual and the society.

**Peter Charles Unsinger**  
San Jose State University

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**Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism and Latin America**, by Stephen G. Rabe, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1988, 237 pages, \$29.95.

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Stephen G. Rabe has set forth a revisionist alternative about the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Until recently, U.S. historians of Latin America have often accepted the notion of a languid World War II figurehead in the White House from 1953 to 1961. Ike's grandson David, and scholars such as Stephen E. Ambrose, Robert A. Divine, Fred I. Greenstein, Steve Neal and Herbert S. Parmet have changed this interpretation to reveal Eisenhower as a strong figure who shaped policy himself.

Rabe, however, is offended that Ike is made out to be a humane statesman. Not so, he says, Eisenhower did not merely play golf while his anti-communist Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, went red witch hunting in Latin America. According to Rabe, Eisenhower personally led the charge to put anti-communism before economic aid programs for Latin America. He advances that the military dictators who governed the nations south of the Rio Grande in 1957 were a direct result of these policies.

In order to stress his point, Rabe mentions five times the mis-

guided award of the Legion of Merit to military tyrants Manuel Odria in Peru and Marcos Perez Jimenez in Venezuela. Whether or not the U.S. Congress would have even considered a humanitarian aid program for Latin America just after the Korean Conflict, had Eisenhower recommended it, is never mentioned. There is no evaluation of worldwide communist military expansion between 1953 and 1961, so that, by omission of rationale, Eisenhower is made to look like a fool as he dogmatically demanded anti-communism in an area plagued by economic underdevelopment.

Yet this book is a milestone in U.S.-Latin American diplomatic history. Rabe did extensive research in the Eisenhower Library and among recently declassified National Security Council documents. He has given Latin American history its first book written in the language of international relations. He cites National Security Council documents by number and traces foreign policy to its actual source within the executive branch. Greater detail is now required by anyone who would analyze the Eisenhower years and their impact upon Latin America. With attention to detail will come the heightened East-West awareness that is lacking among U.S. scholars.

Rabe's book contains two chapters on the Cuban revolution of 1957-1959 and that critical period in Cuban foreign relations. These chapters may be the best short treatment to date on that vital subject. He also traces Harry Truman's Latin America policy. Even though he curiously omits Secretary of State George C. Marshall's strongly anti-communist position at the Bogota IXth Inter-American Conference in 1948, he still shows that it was Truman, not Eisenhower, who extended the U.S. policy of containment to Latin America.

The author portrays the Colombian Battalion that fought for the

United Nations Command in Korea as a token. This is a historical inaccuracy that raises questions in the reader's mind. Is the author deliberately omitting evidence which shows that Latin Americans, at the grass roots level, often thought and showed that the military expansion of communism in the 1950's was a danger to be opposed? A related criticism lies in a cause-and-effect assertion about the Central Intelligence Agency role in helping to overthrow the leftist Arbenz administration in Guatemala. What could have been a step forward in scholarly understanding about a U.S. foreign policy over-reaction disappears in the murky assertion that 100,000 Guatemalan citizens died as a direct result of U.S. intervention.

Rabe is really reasserting Edwin Lieuwen's 1960 thesis that all U.S. military training and arms transfers to Latin America in the Truman-Eisenhower years were window dressing for a U.S. scheme to build a network of anti-communist strongmen throughout Latin America. Subsequent research on Latin America, on Third World arms transfers and on comparative military regimes in developing nations all combine to render the Lieuwen thesis invalid. Rabe researched more than enough evidence to see past Lieuwen's work.

**Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism and Latin America** raises the stakes in the writing of U.S.-Latin American history to a new high. Stephen G. Rabe has done a vital piece of original scholarship. He has also opened the door for U.S. scholars of Latin America to abandon some of their comfortable guilt myths about their own country's role in Latin America.

**Russell W. Ramsey**  
Maxwell AFB, Ala

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**Great Battles of the Civil War**, by John MacDonald, New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1988, 200 pages, \$39.95.

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**Great Battles of the Civil War** provides an excellent introduction to 17 key engagements during the War Between the States. John MacDonald is a specialist on the American Civil War. Canvassing both the Eastern and Western theaters of the conflict, he provides sufficient detail to provide a general understanding of each engagement and whets the reader's appetite for further study. Liberal illustration and extensive map support give an excellent historical perspective and a simple appreciation of the chronology of events. As an introduction to each engagement, MacDonald presents a biographical overview of the key leaders involved. He also includes a subtle reference to the human aspects of campaigning in the 1860's. Beyond a discussion of combat operations, the book addresses, in general terms, combat support and combat service support.

A unique and innovative aspect of **Great Battles of the Civil War** is the use of state-of-the-art computer graphics to illustrate the significant engagements of each campaign. These graphics capture the topography and weather situation as well as the array of forces. Each discussion ends with a short discussion of the "aftermath" of the engagement. MacDonald provides a graphic representation of the ratio of forces involved and the losses suffered. Additionally, the impact of the fighting on the forces and on future campaigns is presented.

**Great Battles of the Civil War** is an excellent introductory study of some of the key battles during the Civil War. The only inaccuracy I found was the use of the popular notion that slavery was non-existent in the Northern states by

1860. I recommend this book for purchase by Army libraries and serious military history students.

**Captain Robert G. Grace**  
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

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**George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol**, by Harry Schwartz, New York: Free Press, London: Collier MacMillan, 1987, 250 pages, \$22.50.

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The world has always seen George Washington as pivotal to the American success in the Revolutionary War. He was also a major factor in solidifying public support for the new government. He became our ideal figure, the tangible personification of an American "spirit." In a way, Washington as general, first citizen and president became sanctified in his own lifetime. He was widely honored, venerated and respected, with an abundance of images and mementos surrounding his name. He did not seek this elevated public status and esteem, and this lack of pursuit merely encouraged further widespread adulation.

This transition from military leader with little experience in major battles, to a great figurehead of the new nation is the theme of Barry Schwartz's book and it has a number of implications regarding image-building, domestic propaganda and an estimate of our own national character. The author's research follows a novel approach, the study of the portrayal of Washington as a legendary figure and not of Washington the person.

Schwartz observes that Washington may not have been the best, most brilliant of our revolutionary leaders. Yet he became a symbol of our national identity and moral sentiments and that image remains until this day. While he was not a charismatic hero, he

was a commanding figure, even if he appeared aloof, modest and reticent. In the new republic we needed a leader beyond reproach, personifying all that the nation esteemed.

Washington as national leader and president was capable of appearing to be above the conflict and din of petty politics. Schwartz notes that Washington gained the nation's undying respect by trying to avoid power and by enthusiastically relinquishing it. (Today this approach seems to be echoed by the disclaimers of many modern presidential candidates.)

The author describes in detail the creation of a presidential image at the end of the 18th century. The creators often borrowed aspects from the ceremonial displays of European powers. Drawing upon old correspondence, records of community festivities and newspaper columns, poems, orations and eulogies, a pattern of ritual emerges that was to continue throughout the first years of the presidency. Washington accepted many honors but was never seen to pursue them. He was a true revolutionary dedicated totally to the American cause, with little hope of adequate reward.

In Schwartz's view Washington was not venerated so much for a record of military achievement but rather because he fulfilled a symbolic need, bonding the political and religious sentiments of society. Gradually Washington then became a moral figurehead and an object of emotional attachment. John Adams was naturally suspicious of the pomp and hero worship accorded Washington. John Paine and others berated him.

In one of the more interesting sections of the book Schwartz describes Washington's assumption of his role as Commander-in-Chief without an army, without a declaration of war, indeed without a firmly established nation. Benjamin Rush, extolled Washington's "martial dignity," a feeling shared



by many. Americans did not necessarily look for the best military officer available but one in whom they had the most trust. Washington's military duties were more expansive than those now commonly assigned to commanding officers. He was personally responsible for much of the recruitment, acquisition of supplies and weapons, and other routine functions. He took his responsibility seriously, as he did all other tasks that he accepted. Washington's popularity was largely due to the virtues that he epitomized, offering selflessness and self-denial in the service of the public good. He distinguished himself as a hero by the total disregard of himself and by the sincerity of his motives.

Schwartz's book could have taken a different turn, but in the end it shows Washington truly worthy of his merit. A strong, yet wonderful passage in this book presents a poignant picture of Washington surrendering his commission in a procedure designed by congressional leaders to humble the military hero. Instead, Washington's generous attitude and submission to congress only served to enhance his own image, contributing to the idolization of the leader and hero that we know today.

**Michael O. Shannon**  
Bergenfield, N.J.

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**East Asia, the West and International Security**, edited by Robert O'Neill, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1987, 253 pages, \$29.50.

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The recent extension of Soviet power and influence in the Far East has prompted new regional imperatives that must be considered in determining security policies for the Asian Theater. **East**

**Asia, the West and International Security** is a collection of papers presented during the 28th Annual International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Conference held in Kyoto, Japan 8-11 September 1986. The wide range of experts who attended the conference analyzed the key factors affecting East Asian security. Although participants came from both East and West, one theme dominates the 20 papers presented in the book — the security of East Asia is of major and continuing importance to world order, and policies affecting that security are changing. The dynamics of East Asian security are highlighted by not only discussions on Soviet attempts to enhance their influence in the Far East but also on China's evolving security role and the possible decrease of U.S. willingness to sustain the joint East Asian defense burden.

Dr. Henry Kissinger's short paper leads off the collection by pointing out the key differences between the perceptions of security in Asia from those in Europe. Complexity is one of the differences. Kissinger states that the lack of common strategies, few integrated military commands and variations of threat perception make East Asian security challenging and dynamic. He illustrates just how different the perceptions are by writing, "The difference is the difference between European paintings and Japanese paintings. In a European painting every detail is filled in and very little is left to the imagination. In a Japanese painting it is the empty spaces which give meaning to the design and they leave a great deal therefore to the perception of the observer."

The papers following Kissinger's discuss the diversity of current Soviet, Chinese and U.S. perceived security threats in the Far East. Although the conference papers address numerous security policy considerations, one common thread ties many of the

papers together — the Soviet Union's recent attempts to undertake a more active presence and influence in East Asia. In no other region of the world has there been such a major discrepancy between Soviet military power and political influence. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam and replacement by Soviet maritime power, the growth in size and quantity of the Soviet Navy, the continuing economic development of the Soviet Far East and accompanying expansion in economic activity have given the Soviet Union momentum in its Pacific role. Harry Gelman, a senior staff member of the Rand Corporation, writes in his paper that the momentum is one that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev must view as still tentative and opportunistic since the Soviets are handicapped by their weak economy, backward technology and the inadequate earning capacity of the Soviet hard currency.

Along with the discussion on Soviet influence in Asia, Dr. Geoffrey Kemp from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes in his paper about the lack of an overall U.S. strategy for the Pacific. He acknowledges the numerous U.S. commitments: defense of Korea and Japan; protection of sea lanes, and security of the Persian Gulf oil fields. However, Kemp points out that these commitments do not add up to a coherent and readily understood strategy. This lack of a consolidated U.S. Pacific strategy juxtaposed against the growing Soviet power in East Asia is potentially dangerous to the successful execution of U.S. administration goals.

During the course of this book, several authors briefly address the complexities and contradictions of strategic trends in Asia. However, no individual paper analyzes in depth the security issues at stake. This collection of papers represents a cursory view at a complex issue. For readers seeking a detailed view of the political



intrigues of East Asian security issues this is not the book to read. Scan it briefly in the library if available, but do not buy the book.

**Captain Leonard S. Kosakowski**  
Fort Meade, Md.

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**The Secret War Against Hitler** by William Casey, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988, 304 pages, \$19.95.

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The memoirs of the late Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, who was often a controversial figure in the news media in the 1980's, have finally been published. Much of the credit for publication of his World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) experiences must go to his wife, Sophia.

The book, a project Casey worked at on and off over the years, but in earnest in the last year of his life, is one of the best books I've read about the OSS. It shows how General "Wild Bill" Donovan chose, developed and delegated authority to very young intelligence officers for conduct of the clandestine war against Hitler. Behind-the-line intelligence and sabotage operations in wartime Europe were definitely a young man's effort. At the age of 31, after various assignments, Casey was placed in charge of special intelligence — getting agent nets established within the boundaries of Nazi Germany.

In his opening chapter, Casey tells how the United States neglected having a trained intelligence corps. Casey cites the Army as having only a total of 80 intelligence people — officers, enlisted men and civilians — on intelligence duty in Washington and a handful of attaches at overseas missions at the outbreak of the war. And worse yet, there was no single focal point within the government to perform all-source analysis of raw intelligence infor-

mation to be processed into finished intelligence products.

Casey tells of arriving in wartime London at the OSS offices, of working with the British and the efforts to "set Europe ablaze." He also tells of the need for timely and accurate intelligence. Even in wartime, bureaucratic turf battles arose. Casey, among other informative insights, relates how these bureaucratic battles were resolved.

One particularly interesting chapter deals with the air targeting intelligence effort and how economic analysis was performed to help highlight which industries, if destroyed or damaged by Allied bombing campaigns, could bring German industrial might to a screeching halt. Sabotage and guerrilla interdiction targets were chosen on the basis of economic analysis.

The formation of "Jedburgh" teams to support Operation OVERLORD was also the focus of efforts at 70 Grosvenor Square where the OSS was headquartered in wartime London. The where and how of blocking reinforcements sent by Hitler was critical. Eisenhower was assembling the largest invasion force the world had ever seen, and to be defeated on the beaches of Normandy could have spelled disaster for the Allies. The Jedburgh teams were infiltrated into and worked effectively with French resistance groups to pinpoint German Army troop concentrations, dispositions and mobility capabilities for Allied bombing raids and strategic deception operations.

Casey also writes of the personalities of Donovan and Allen Dulles, the OSS Chief of Station in Berne, Switzerland. Donovan had the ability of working tirelessly and showing up wherever the action was taking place in the European Theater of Operations.

The highlight of the book is the chapter on training and dispatching agents into the heart of Nazi

Germany in 1945 to establish agent nets for collecting and reporting strategic and operational-level intelligence to support U.S. Army ground force commanders. Casey tells in detail how line-crossers, POWs and nationals of Nazi-occupied countries were recruited and inserted into the Nazi heartland.

Although Bill Casey died before he could write the final chapter of his book, his secret 18-page after-action report, "Final Report on SI Operations into Germany," declassified only in January of 1988, stands as testimony to how he felt about clandestine intelligence collection and sabotage operations. Perhaps it was because of his OSS background and his proclivity for being action-oriented, that President Reagan named Casey to head the CIA. The American intelligence community won't be the same without him. Casey's record stands as a legacy to his role in a vital and dynamic period of American intelligence history and should be read by every intelligence professional.

**Captain Eric K. Naeseth**  
Fort Meade, Md.

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**East West Conflict: Elite Perceptions and Political Options** edited by Michael D. Intriligator and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988, 210 pages, \$28.50.

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In June of 1986, a group of scholars met in Bonn to discuss elite perceptions and political options as they relate to the East-West conflict. The results of that conference are published in this book edited by Michael D. Intriligator and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. The book claims to examine the habits, labels, propaganda and disinformation in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany

(FRG) and the Soviet Union. The book's purpose is to search for alternative strategies for the U.S. and the FRG in coming to grips with the true nature of their own relationship and their future association with the Soviet Union.

In the third chapter, Ole Holsti does an excellent job in relating public opinion research on the U.S. elite's views towards the Soviet Union. He clearly defines "elites" and then explains, in laymen terms, his methodology. His conclusions may be surprising to some. First, containing communism is not a dominant goal of the U.S. elite. Second, many of our elite believe that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have congruent goals and the Soviets often act defensively. Holsti also links ideological and political party preference to the elite's view of the Soviet Union. Though he admits his analysis of long-term trends is incomplete, a broad consensus of U.S. elite's views toward the Soviet Union is unlikely.

Only two articles attempt to come to grips with the Soviet view towards the U.S. and the FRG. The first of these articles, by Morton Schwartz, focuses on the broad problems President Gorbachev faces when confronting the United States. Mr. Schwartz does an excellent job in categorizing Gorbachev's past problems, but does not address the future. Wolfgang Pfeiler's article on Soviet perceptions of West Germany (FRG) is excellent. He begins with the Soviet's traditional mixed feeling towards Germany as not only the home of socialism but the home of Nazism. Through Russian eyes, Mr. Pfeiler works his way through the complex issues of FRG-U.S. interests, NATO and the future of German reunification.

Andrzej Korbonski contributes a good deal of original thought in his article on the German question from an Eastern European perspective. Focusing on the views of policy makers in Poland and

Czechoslovakia, Korbonski argues that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is seen as a member in good standing of the Eastern Bloc, but some antagonisms still exist. The most obvious antagonism Korbonski sees is Polish and Czech jealousy towards the GDR because of Moscow's constant attention and the GDR's higher living standards.

The book's biggest problem is not in what it says, but what it does not say. Though the introduction mentions propaganda and disinformation, these important subjects are conspicuously absent. Additionally, the introduction implies there may be propaganda and disinformation about the Soviet Union generated from Western sources. This interesting premise is also ignored. At first glance the book may seem to be what Shakespeare meant when he authored "Much Ado About Nothing," but the book's good chapters are certainly worth reading.

**Captain Lance Eldridge**  
Woodbridge, Vir.

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**Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution**, edited by Martin Kramer, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1987, 324 pages, \$39.85.

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The editor's preface to this volume states, "The aim of this book is twofold: to assess the present situation of mainstream (*Twelver*) Shi'ism in each part of this world and to measure the effects of Iran's revolution throughout it." The editor and contributing authors accomplish that goal, and more. In addition to Martin Kramer, the editor, the contributors include such academic luminaries as Bernard Lewis, the well-known and respected Middle East historian.

This book is a superb contribution on the subject of a branch of

Islam which has been in the shadows of Islamic study for far too long. With the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the advent of the Iran-Iraq war, Western scholarship tended to focus on the effects of Shi'ism in the Middle East. But the book goes further than that and examines Shi'ism and its potential to provide a revolutionary impulse to peoples of that region, through Southwest Asia and into the Indian sub-continent.

A brief and understandable history of Shi'ism is provided in the introduction making this text useful reading for beginners and academics alike. The contributing authors explore the underlying causes of Shi'i unrest from both historical and contemporary perspectives. This provides the reader with a much better understanding of today's issues than can be found in the usual scholarly texts or mass media.

With the exception of Iran, Shi'ism is a minority religion. The authors agree that Shi'ism's minority status in the region of the Middle East belies its potential influence. One only has to view the spectacle of U.S. warships deployed in the Persian Gulf to understand, in small part, the impact of Shi'ism within the Iranian context and its subsequent impact on the West. Shi'i Islam will continue to have a dynamic influence on regional politics into the foreseeable future.

If you have an interest in this area of study, read this book. If you want to better understand the Iranian revolution, read this book. If you wish to know why Saudi Arabia fears Iran domestically as well as militarily, read this book. If you want to know what role the *Amal* play in Lebanon, read this book.

**Major Robert B. Adolph, Jr.**  
Fort Bragg, N.C.

## 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Training)

The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Training) is assigned to the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade (Training) at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The 1,100-soldier battalion consists of three staff and faculty companies, the Aviation Training Support Company and the Training Support Company (CEWI). The battalion is now organizing and equipping the Army's first unmanned aerial vehicle platoon.

The battalion supports the Intelligence Center and School's training, combat developments and testing missions. It includes the vast majority of the Center and School's "permanent party." The 1st's motto, "Be-A-Go-To-War-Soldier," reflects the battalion's commitment to soldier and leader excellence.

Teal blue and yellow were the colors used by Army Intelligence before there was a branch and for tradition are still the colors used on the crest of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. (The official colors of Military Intelligence Branch are oriental blue and silver gray.) The tactical and strategic phases of intelligence are symbolized by the checkered background which represents a chessboard. The three divisions of the field denote the three main phases of intelligence: collection, production and dissemination. Wisdom and silence are symbolized by the Sphinx. The color black alludes to secrecy. The architectural construction represents a place of learning and the lamp of knowledge symbolizes enlightenment. Military leadership is represented by the sheathed saber. Motto: Veritas, Vigilantia, Victoria (Truth, Vigilance, Victory).

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